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Revoking Rights
Craig J. Konnoth*
In important areas of law, such as the vested rights doctrine, and in several important
cases—including those involving the continued validity of same-sex marriages and the
Affordable Care Act—courts have scrutinized the revocation of rights once granted more
closely than the failure to provide the rights in the first place. This project claims that in so
doing, courts seek to preserve important constitutional interests. On the one hand, based
on our understanding of rights possession, rights revocation implicates autonomy
interests of the rights holder to a greater degree than a failure to afford rights at the outset.
On the other hand, the institution revoking rights is more likely to exhibit impermissible
behavior when taking away rather than failing to provide the right.
This is the first of two articles, and tackles the first of the project’s claims. It examines the
autonomy interests of the rights holder that are implicated in rights revocation. It relies on
philosophical understandings of ownership, backed by empirical research, to argue that
our identities and indeed, our ability to think of ourselves as separate beings apart from
the collective, are partially based on what we possess at a given point in time. The rights
we possess both allow us to do things that aid in our flourishing and allow us to conceive
of ourselves as individuals. Important legal concepts, such as the vested rights doctrine,
among others, rely on this understanding of rights.
However, the notion of rights, possession, and revocation are all constructed and subject
to contestation. Courts and other institutional actors often face adversaries making
(conflicting) rights claims. They must determine when a change in rights allocation is a
rights revocation or a restoration of the status quo ante. In taking sides, courts and
legislatures adopt rights revocation/restoration frames, claiming that the winners have
rights that are being restored, and that losers never had rights to begin with, or that their
rights existed temporarily subject to correction. In so doing, institutional actors also shore
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up their own legitimacy, often at the cost of each other. This dynamic provides an insight,
not just into the work that rights do in constructing individuals, but also in developing
institutional legitimacy. It shows how institutions themselves exploit rights claims in order
to—consciously or not—further their own agendas.
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Can the government take away rights or benefits from individuals or
entities once they have been granted? In recent cases involving hot
button issues such as same-sex marriage litigation as well as Medicaid
expansion and in more mundane welfare or child custody cases, courts and
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advocates have argued that in certain situations, the answer is no. Their
reasoning relies on a long history of judicial hostility to rights revocation.
This Article contends that this hostility is based on an understanding that
already endowed rights are embedded in, connected to, and constitute
individuals or entities—their personhood and identities—in a way that
rights that have yet to be granted are not. Taking away previously granted
rights fundamentally alters the nature of the existence and identity of the
individual or entity, and must therefore be closely scrutinized. Given this
understanding, the battle often shifts to the question of what a right is, or
what should be understood as a revocation—questions that are subject to
social, legal, and political contestation, the consequences of which often
determine the outcome in these cases.
This understanding of endowed rights as deeply shaping one’s
identity and being has deep roots, both philosophical and empirical, as
Part I explains. The philosophical account proceeds in two different ways.
On the one hand, we exercise rights we possess to develop our personhood.
On the other hand, these rights are part of who we are, shaping our sense
of self. These claims are empirically supported by phenomena that
developmental and behavioral psychologists refer to as self-anchoring and
the endowment effect. I call this the “connectedness” account of rights
ownership to distinguish it from other concepts of ownership that do not
depend upon the connection between the individual and the property or
right.
Part II turns to legal concepts and doctrines that have long reflected
this connectedness account. As Part II.A explains, since the earliest uses
of the word “rights” to denote subjective faculties, legal concepts have
treated rights as connected to and constitutive of one’s being. Now
largely defunct legal doctrines, such as “vesting,” corruption of blood,
attainder, and forfeiture, captured and relied on this idea that rights in
property are connected to and embedded in an individual. The most
important of these legal doctrines, however, is the vested rights doctrine.
Part II.B, therefore, turns to and examines the vested rights doctrine
in some depth. The vested rights doctrine prohibits or otherwise limits
the revocation of certain existing rights, usually in contract and property.
As this Subpart shows, the various doctrinal elements of the vested rights
doctrine that measure the length of time a right was possessed, the
reliance on the right, and the formalities that accompanied the genesis of
the right, all ultimately seek to investigate how connected the right is to
the personhood and life of the owner. When a right has reached a certain
level of connection, it cannot be revoked.
A mainstay of constitutional litigation in the nineteenth century, the
doctrine was rarely invoked after the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments except in specialized areas of litigation involving, for example,
zoning and pensions. The doctrine has recently moved back into the
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mainstream as marriage equality advocates have heavily relied on it to
prevent revocation of same-sex marriage rights. In these cases, courts
1
have invalidated same-sex marriage bans. Most of these courts stayed
the rulings pending appeal. However, in certain jurisdictions—Utah,
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana—injunctions requiring the states to
recognize same-sex marriage went into effect immediately, and some
2
time lapsed before they were stayed by higher courts. During this time,
3
numerous couples married. These states argue that they need not
recognize those marriages. Couples that have married claim that because
their marriage rights vested upon the granting of the marriage license,
they cannot be “strip[ped]” or “taken away” from the couples; thus, they
sought preliminary injunctions requiring the recognition of their
4
marriages. These cases will remain active no matter the result in the
5
marriage litigation currently before the Supreme Court. Even if the
Supreme Court ultimately holds that the Constitution provides marriage
equality rights, the concerns regarding the financial and other losses that
these couples have suffered in the interim because their states have
6
refused to recognize their marriage rights will remain live. Thus, Part
II.B concludes with a closer examination of these cases.
But courts do not necessarily rely on formal constitutional doctrines
7
when they resist rights revocation. In the welfare arena, for example, the
Court introduced procedural safeguards only for rights revocation without
ever invoking the vested rights doctrine. Similarly, in the Affordable Care
Act case, only one issue garnered agreement among a supermajority of the
Supreme Court’s Justices: although Congress was not obliged to provide
Medicaid funding to states in the first place, once provided, the threat to
8
withdraw this funding was problematic. Again, while the Justices did not
invoke the vested rights doctrine, connectedness-based concerns best

1. See Marriage Litigation, Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation (last
visited June 9, 2015).
2. See Herbert v. Evans, 135 S. Ct. 16 (2014) (granting stay of the district court’s decision to issue
a preliminary injunction “pending final disposition of the appeal”); Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 4, Caspar v. Snyder, No. 14-cv-11499, 2015 WL 224741 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
Motion].
3. See Motion, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Motion for and Memor[an]d[u]m in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 18, Evans v. Utah, 21
F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1198 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 2:14-CV55-DAK) [hereinafter Motion & Memorandum];
Motion, supra note 2, at 18.
5. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-556) (argued
Apr. 28, 2015).
6. See, e.g., Motion & Memorandum, supra note 4, at 9–16 (describing financial and emotional
harms); Motion, supra note 2, at 6–7 (describing payments plaintiffs have had to make in the interim
because employer’s insurance would not cover spouse as long as the state did not recognize the marriage).
7. For simplicity’s sake, I use “rights revocation” also to refer to revocation of the broader
panoply of liberties, privileges, and benefits that an individual possesses.
8. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–07 (2012).

K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete)

1370

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/22/2015 9:49 PM

[Vol. 66:1365

explain the Court’s approach, as this Article explains in Part II.C. In all
these cases, what was at stake was the deprivation of a core right or set of
benefits, around which the legal and personal identity of the individual or
entity was constructed. Courts therefore were skeptical of the revocation
of these rights and benefits.
This Article’s account of hostility to rights revocation is based on
solicitude toward rights holders: courts seek to protect the personhood
interests and connectedness of the rights holders, no matter what institution
is revoking the right. But another reason courts have resisted rights
revocation is to police the intent or behavior of the rights revokers, no
matter the effect of the revocation on the rights holder. Courts (claim to)
more easily detect animus, arbitrariness, or other improper motivation
when these institutions take away already-granted rights than when they
deny rights at the outset. The Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of California’s
Proposition 8, which took away same-sex couples’ right to marry, is one
9
such example. Similarly, before the 2012 election, the Sixth Circuit held
that the Ohio legislature’s retraction of early voting in the weekend before
the elections for everyone except military voters was impermissible:
“[W]here the State has authorized in-person early voting through the
Monday before Election Day for all voters, ‘the State may not, by later
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of
10
11
another.’” I save these questions for another article.
12
Nonetheless, cases like Perry v. Schwarzenegger and similar
institutional-policing cases make a cameo in this Article as well. Like the
vested rights, welfare, and Affordable Act cases, they present more
universal questions that cannot be deferred. What is this metaphysical
thing we call a right? And more importantly, what does it mean to take it
away? Litigants and social movements are constantly at work, framing
different interests as rights and claiming that a redistribution results in
“revocation.” The Proposition 8 proponents, for example, claimed that
they were merely “restoring” the right to “define marriage”; gay activists
protested the loss of a right to marry, and claimed that the proponents were

9. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on jurisdictional grounds by
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
10. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 910 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000)), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit essentially “embraced
[the district court’s] reasoning.” Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1836, 1845 (2013). Other scholars have referred, in passing, to the retrogression
principle apparent in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. See id. at 1844, 1846; Richard L. Hasen, The 2012
Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1865,
1880–82 (2013).
11. See Craig Konnoth, Reasoning in Rights Revocation Cases: Policing Institutional Roles (Sept.
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Cases that appear in the follow-up article include
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
12. 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011).
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restoring nothing, but rather, taking away a right. Framing an interest an
individual has in doing something (for example, “defining marriage”) as a
legal right helps establish a sense of connection with the interest that one
may not feel to another, arbitrarily held interest. Thus, plaintiffs and
other actors seek to frame their claims using rights language to drum up
support both within their movement and from governmental actors. This
in turn affects their sense of who they are, their preferences, and the claims
they advance. Courts and other state actors, in turn, will frame the claim
of the winning side as a “right.”
In the long run, courts and legislatures themselves seek to tap into
the power of the revocation/restoration frame to shore up their own
legitimacy. On this account, the language of revocation and restoration is
used not just to legitimize plaintiffs’ claims to a right, but also the power
of courts themselves. Courts frame the winners as rights holders, thus
suggesting that they themselves are rights restorers, remedying revocations
by other institutional actors, such as legislatures. Legislatures may respond
by painting courts as taking away rights improperly, and in turn, claim the
mantle of rights restorers, passing legislation that “restores” the rights that
courts took away. The narrative of “rolling back” rights is therefore subject
to contestation. The notion of what a right is and whether that right is
possessed in the first place is part of a broader jurisgenerative struggle.
This struggle does not nullify the doctrinal categories through which
constitutional rights are analyzed, nor the power of the rights rollback
narrative; rather, the fact that movements and governmental institutions
struggle over these categories is both evidence of, and further reifies
their power in, our legal discourse.
It bears noting that both the connectedness- and institutionalpolicing accounts of rights reversal are novel. Despite the commonality
of the practice, few scholars have examined, and none have explained,
judicial disfavor of rights reversal. Those that consider rights reversal as
an independent matter generally dismiss the phenomenon as essentially
13
policymaking from the bench. In their 1998 article, John Jeffries and
Daryl Levinson consider then-recent constitutional cases, which they argue
exhibited a “non-retrogression principle,” and assert that such a principle
14
constitutes no more than judicial policymaking. Cass Sunstein, in his
earlier work culminating in The Partial Constitution, also points to a “status
quo bias” in constitutional (and other areas of) law, which result in courts’
treating any revocation that causes a deviation from the status quo with
15
hostility. As relevant to the problem here, Sunstein treats the status quo
13. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 45–46 (1993); John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 1211,
1220 (1998). I engage Sunstein’s work with greater depth later in this Article. See infra Part IV.
14. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 13, at 1220.
15. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 168.
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bias as the product of policy preferences as opposed to one serving
constitutional interests. Hence, he argues, deliberative democracy must
16
engage in constructing those preferences in a just manner.
Given this lacuna, the other natural place to which one may turn to
explain aversion to rights revocation is the literature on the vested rights
doctrine. While the vested rights doctrine is one among the several sets of
doctrines and approaches in Part II that reflects a connectedness account
of rights holding, it is the only one of these doctrines that has enjoyed
sustained contemporary scholarly and judicial attention. However,
scholarship on vested rights is scarcely more enlightening. Indeed, some
have despaired of explaining why, upon the vesting of a right, it cannot
17
be revoked, even if it need not have been granted in the first place.
Those that are more optimistic provide two dominant accounts, neither
of which can easily be extrapolated to the question of why courts dislike
rights revocation outside the vested rights context, and both of which
seem incomplete.
First, according to some, vested rights are based on constitutionally
unenumerated natural law principles and are often coupled with and
treated as the precursors to substantive due process. Edward Corwin,
18
John Ely, and James Kainen all make variations of this argument. Larry
16. Id. The question this Article deals with is analytically independent of the question of
constitutional baselines. A constitutional baseline—either descriptive or normative—discusses what rights
are or should be in a given situation. While that is an important question (and, as I demonstrate in the
final Part, related to the question I deal with here), it is an independent one from the one that I deal with
at least in the first two Parts of this Article. My thesis in Parts I–II is that courts’ discomfort with rights
revocation is independent of the fact that the Constitution may mandate the granting of that right in the
first place (that is, set a baseline). There is something about the perception that a right is being revoked
that animates the courts to protect the right more urgently than they otherwise would based solely on the
constitutional command that the right be granted. The final Part recognizes the importance of baselines,
but argues that it is the framings of revocation and restoration that affect what we see of as a baseline in
the first place, rather than the other way around as commentators seem to have argued. See, e.g., Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1293, 1352 (1984) (“[T]he distinction between liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats turns
on the establishment of an acceptable baseline against which to measure a person’s position after imposition
of an allocation.”). I therefore do not directly engage with the large literature on constitutional baselines
more generally. See generally Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of
Optional Baselines, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175 (1989).
17. They therefore concluded that all retroactivity should be constitutional. See, e.g., Michael J.
Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1822 (1986) (noting his previous contribution
that all changes in the law have an economic impact on the value of existing assets); Louis Kaplow, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 512 (1986) (arguing that governmental
policy changes affect reliance interests, similar to changes in the market; thus, it is better to rely on the
market than on transition relief); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1069–73 (1997) (explaining that retroactivity is an indeterminate
concept, better understood as a range of temporal options rather than a binary construct); id. at 1079
(“[M]ost new rules impose some retroactive effects [, which] undermines the claim that retroactive
legislation necessarily violates the Due Process or Takings Clauses.”).
18. See generally Edward Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (pts.
1 & 2), 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 460 (1911); Edward Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review in New York:
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Tribe similarly argues that vested rights theory was a precursor to the
flowering of natural rights ideas developed through substantive due
19
process. Under a second account, Michael McConnell and Nathan
Chapman are the latest in a series of scholars to argue that the vested
rights doctrine concerns separation of powers—courts used the doctrine
to invalidate what they considered to be legislative imposition of a judicial
20
sentence. As Marbury v. Madison itself teaches us, “The question whether
a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by
21
the judicial authority.” Vested rights, on this account, are those property
rights that can only be taken away by due process of law, pursuant to
judicial decree.
Both accounts are deficient. Vested rights are not natural rights in
the same way as fundamental rights (under substantive due process). An
ex ante denial of a fundamental right is just as bad as ex post deprivation
of the right; but the vested rights doctrine penalizes only deprivations, not
denials, of the right. The separation of powers explanation, in turn, is also
limited because it simply begs the question: if vested rights are those
rights that require judicial intervention to be divested, we still need an
22
explanation why these rights require judicial intervention. Further, there

1783–1905, 15 Mich. L. Rev. 281–313 (1917); Laura Inglis, Substantive Due Process: Continuation of
Vested Rights?, 52 Am. J. Legal Hist. 459 (2012); James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving
Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 114 (1994)
(“Vesting became a question of substantive justice rather than legal definition . . .”). Another explanation
that I categorize in a similar vein is that of John Hardin Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review 14–21, 73–75 (1980). Ely claims that judges differentiate vested rights from substantive
due process rights because the former derive their authority from positive law, and the latter from natural
law. Id. They both represent approaches to rights protections that are fashioned after the legal
philosophies of their day.
19. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 415–34 (1978).
20. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012). Others are of the same school of thought, at least with respect to
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive
Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L.J. 408, 411–12 (2010).
21. 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803).
22. John Harrison makes a similar point. John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493, 522 (1997). Chapman and McConnell begin to provide this
explanation, arguing that rules that divest property rights in a manner that are not both general and
prospective require judicial intervention. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 20, at 1677–79. Yet,
there are three problems with this explanation. First, (to their credit) they also point to several cases
where courts invalidated seemingly “general” property divestments. Id. at 1718, 1751; see, e.g., Hoke v.
Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 15–16 (1833) (any holder of a certain office divested of the office);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (all holders of a certain grant of land divested of the
land). Although Chapman and McConnell frame these as general divestments of property, I do not think
that these cases can be lumped together with situations in which the legislature targets a particular
individual to take away her property in particular, without due process of law—Chapman and
McConnell’s archetypal example. Second, the approach fails to sufficiently cabin courts rather capacious
definition of property during this period. See Kainen, supra note 18. Third, even if courts considered whether
the taking was general and retroactive, Chapman & McConnell provide no conceptual explanation as
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is reason to doubt that lack of judicial oversight was the sole reason for
invalidating revocations of vested rights—even revocations with judicial
process were sometimes viewed with suspicion. Indeed, contemporary
thinkers, including numerous Framers, felt that even judicial process could
23
not deprive certain rights once bestowed. This suggests that the problem
with taking away vested rights, in some situations, at least, was less that
the wrong branch took away the right, but rather that there is something
about certain vested rights that prevents any branch of the government
from taking the rights away at all. Suggesting that vested rights are vested
because they are identified with the judicial power puts the cart before the
horse: heightened judicial protections for vested rights exist because of
their vestedness, but these protections do not define what vestedness is. As
Ann Woolhandler puts it, “the separation of powers concerns underlying”
vested rights and related doctrines “can only be applied by taking into
24
account the substantive rights at issue.” Thus, for what Corwin referred

to why these considerations are important, and require due process (nor were they required to, given
their primarily historical approach).
23. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1390 (1992).
24. Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J.
1015, 1019 (2006). Woolhandler, the only scholar I have identified to attempt a systematic treatment,
draws a distinction between “private” and “public” rights. Id. For her, a “positively derived, traditional
property that results from one’s labor and voluntary exchange” can be distinguished from, and “more
securely protects individuals from the state than . . . statutory entitlements.” Id. at 1061–62. As she
explains, “the public/private line distinguishes between statutory and common law rights, making the
former easier to abrogate than the latter.” Id. at 1060. Woolhandler admits that her thesis is more
descriptive than prescriptive: she justifies the line by noting that “we have in the past and continue to
provide more protection for traditional common law interests.” Id. at 1061; see also Stephen F. Williams,
Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal Stud. 3, 11–12 (1983) (arguing
that judicial protection of traditional property rights serves as an external check on encroachment by
nonjudicial branches of government). Although Woolhandler’s distinction has merit—and appears to
have been one of the animating concerns behind the judicial distinction between public and private
rights, it could not have been the only one. Woolhandler does not consider antebellum cases such as
Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina invalidated the
legislature’s attempt to divest an individual of a government office in which, the court found, he had a
vested interest. Yet, this was a deprivation of a public rather than a private benefit. Indeed, in
Marbury itself, the Supreme Court held that a public office was a vested right. 5 U.S. at 162. Similarly,
although corporation charters slowly became treated as private property, in pre-nineteenth century
thought, corporation charters were considered public privileges. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding
the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings”
Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 67–68 (1987) (citing cases). Yet, even then, many argued that
these charters constituted vested rights. Id. at 68–69. The complicated history of these charters, as Siegel
reminds us, challenges the easy distinction between private and public rights. Id. The distinction between
private and public rights is, and remains, complicated. Indeed, it seems almost conclusory to claim that
a right is “public,” and therefore not worthy of protection, versus “private.” Other rights apart from
charter rights, most notably pensions, have a similar, changeable history—transforming from a matter
of privilege to one of right, from public to private, nonvested to vested, depending on historical
circumstances. Just what those circumstances are that produce the public and private distinction remains
to be determined.
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to as “the basic doctrine of American constitutional law,” the vested rights
doctrine has, remarkably, eluded philosophical and historical explanation.
Three caveats merit attention before proceeding. First, I refrain
from making prescriptive claims as to what claims should be, or are, rights,
or whether courts are right in resisting revocation. Rather, any interest
has the potential to be framed as a right, depending upon what the social,
political, and legal context will reasonably accommodate. As a general
matter, the claims of this Article are descriptive rather than prescriptive,
and indeed, the final Part describes the contingent and constructed nature
of both rights and the concept of revocation. Second, courts permit (most)
rights to be taken away with enough process. I do not consider here why
26
that is. Finally, this Article is only the first half of a larger story. As I
note above, a follow up Article explains that in several cases, including
Perry, the courts penalize rights revocation to police the institutions
revoking rights, invoking equality and other principles, rather than relying
27
directly on the harms caused to rights holders.

I. Rights Ownership as Connectedness
Hostility to rights revocation relies on the understanding that owning
a right connects the right to, and embeds the right in, the individual. Under
this account of ownership as connectedness, ownership represents a
philosophical and psychological connection between an individual and
the right. As discussed later in this Part, this is not the only, or even (in
the Fourteenth Amendment context) the dominant modern account of
rights ownership. Nor do I suggest that it is a better account of rights
ownership than any other. However, it explains, as I shall later argue, the
greater solicitude certain legal doctrines exhibit to already owned rights.
Before proceeding, one may notice that throughout the Introduction,
and for the remainder of this Article but most noticeably in this Part, I
slip between individuals’ connection to objects and their connection to
rights. Two reasons justify this approach. First, property scholars and
historians have long argued that our concept of rights as subjective faculties,
the ability to engage in certain activities, is bound up in our concept of

Andrea L. Peterson suggests in passing that another approach is to draw a clear distinction
based on whether “when it first granted the right at issue to A, the government reserved the power to modify
or eliminate that right. In other words, the government gave the right to A with strings attached.” Andrea
L. Peterson. The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current Takings
Clause Doctrine, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1299, 1349–50 (1989). But as Siegel’s work suggests, this distinction is
not tenable given that, starting in the late nineteenth century, courts always implied strings in government
grants. Siegel, supra, at 33–35.
25. Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247,
247 (1914).
26. For a literature review on the subject, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The
Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885 (1981).
27. See Konnoth, supra note 11.
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property as a historical and philosophical matter. Thus, it would be
unsurprising for the philosophical and psychological conception of property
ownership to cross over into rights ownership as well. Second, more
importantly, and perhaps because of the first point, when one speaks of
property or ownership, one is more properly talking about certain rights
with respect to an object. Thus, to suggest that “property” becomes bound
up in an individual is often shorthand for saying that the individual
becomes attached to certain rights with respect to the object, including
possession and certain kinds of uses. Thus, there is no principled reason for
restricting a connectedness account to physical objects—as much as
objects, the ability to exercise certain rights similarly can become bound
up with an individual. Accordingly, courts and scholars, many on whom I
rely on below, also slip between discussing possession of objects and rights,
29
particularly in the vested rights context as discussed in the following Part.
I should note that in providing this account of rights ownership I do
not give a full exposition of how a right is developed. That explanation
must wait until Part III. Until then, a right is best understood as a set of
capabilities that is recognized by the positive law of a jurisdiction. Of course,
not all capabilities are rights and not all rights are deeply embedded in
personhood because of the factors described in greater depth in Part II.B
28. Thus, Carol Rose notes, “[P]roperty analogies have a way of creeping into people’s talk about
all kinds of rights.” Carol M. Rose, Propter Honoris Respectum: Property as the Keystone Right?, 71
Notre Dame L. Rev. 329, 348 (1996). Indeed, property for some “is the symbolic means through which
people convey and receive the meaning of all rights.” Id. at 349. As an example, she gestures to a journal
article by James Madison in which he describes as his property his religious beliefs, reputation, and other,
more abstract possessions. Id. at 348–49 (citing James Madison, Property, Nat’l Gazette, Mar. 27,
1792, reprinted in 14 The Papers of James Madison, 6 April 1791–16 March 1793, at 266 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1983)). Rose notes that some may be troubled by this slippage, partially because of
a broader critique of rights rhetoric and property rhetoric that is beyond the scope of this Article. Id.
at 350 (citing Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 44–47 (1991) (using the
example of Native Americans to illustrate the partiality and injustice of property definitions)). Another
reason to fear the slippage is the commodification thesis that Margaret Jane Radin discusses in MarketInalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1852–53 (1987). However, here I am, if anything, focusing on
the non-commodified personhood values of property, which should not implicate commodification
concerns. While critiques of this slippage exist, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
Richard Tuck, in his canonical history of the development of theories of natural rights,
similarly notes that a theory of natural rights developed from concepts of property. Richard Tuck,
Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development 3 (1979). Early in the history of natural
rights theory, “to have a right was to be the lord or dominus of one’s relevant moral world, to possess
dominium, that is to say, property.” Id. (emphasis in original). Similarly, as a matter of constitutional
law, there was a “reconceptualization of the legal concept of property to include all legally protected
interests” as a result of Hofeldian legal analysis. James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations
of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State,
31 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 444 (1982).
29. Kathleen Sullivan relies on a similar metaphor. Sullivan has argued that certain rights should
similarly be inalienable, and that “some attributes are so closely connected to the person that their alienation
would injure personal identity.” See Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1413, 1485 (1989). Just as different types of property are important to personhood to different degrees,
so too would Sullivan “rank different constitutional rights as more or less central to personal identity.” Id.
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and II.C. But when advocates understand a specific capability to be an
embedded right, they may believe and claim that it should not be easily
revoked. Depending on whether their claim is recognized by the State, their
claims will either be vindicated or fail. Thus, as explained more fully in Part
III, there is no one account on what is an embedded right; rather, multiple
constituents advance claims as to what should be an embedded right with
varying degrees of success.
A. Embedded Rights
When something is owned it transforms personhood in a way that
something that is yet to be owned does not. Philosophers and political
theorists since at least John Locke identify a deep bond between owning
rights in property and personhood. Scholars have developed these claims
in two ways. First, some concentrate on the instrumental value of rights
in developing personhood—being able to use one’s property, skills,
resources, or other abilities helps develop one’s identity overall. Others,
however, go further, and argue that certain rights, when deployed in a
certain manner, become constitutive of personhood. That is, the very
being of the individual becomes infused with the right, the exercise of
which helps, in part, to define the person.
Margaret Radin embraces both approaches. Her famous psychophilosophical account first relies on an instrumental view of property to
develop personhood. Focusing on objects, she concludes that, “to achieve
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some
30
control over resources in the external environment.” Similarly, Jedidiah
Purdy argues that harnessing one’s resources to perform tasks, such as
volunteering, is linked to human flourishing and self-realization because
of the “moral satisfaction” individuals get from participating in such
31
projects. Under this account, time, skill, and talent are forms of property,
and individuals can utilize their ownership interests in these resources to
develop their personhood.
However, possessing a right and deploying it as a means to develop
personhood is different from saying that personhood is constituted by
and infused in the right itself. For example, I may use my property interest
in a bus ticket to go to church, therefore “using it” in some way to engage
in personal development, but I would never claim that my personality
was somehow constructed through or infused in the bus ticket.
Nevertheless, numerous theorists claim that in some cases, personhood
becomes infused in the property and vice versa. Sartre observed that “[t]he
totality of my possessions reflects the totality of my being. I am what I

30. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 957 (1982).
31. Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property: Freedom, Community, and the Legal
Imagination 150–51 (2010).
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32

have . . . . What is mine is myself.” Hegel referred to property as “the
33
existence of [my] personality.” And for Locke, upon a man’s mixing the
34
“[l]abour of his [b]ody” with possessions, they become “properly his.”
Thus, by joining the property to “something that is his own” (his body and
labor) the property becomes “a part of him, that another can no longer have
35
any right to.” Similarly, in explaining how an individual obtains property
interests through adverse possession, Oliver Wendell Holmes explained,
[T]he notion of property . . . is in the nature of man’s mind. A thing
which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether
property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself,
36
however you came by it.

Radin provides both a philosophical and psychological explanation
for this understanding: possessing property is a precondition of conceiving
of an individual in the first place—property is what permits an individual
to project herself into the future or the past; it is required to populate
37
one’s memory with substance. Indeed, even more fundamentally, to
comprehend oneself as a person, one must differentiate and delineate
one’s body and mind from the collective. Rights in one’s body and mind
allow an individual to develop the self in order to achieve this task. It is
the rights to certain objects that allow one to think of oneself as a continuing
entity through time that is able to perform certain actions. Accordingly, as
Radin explains, “persons [are] continuing self-consciousness characterized
by memory [that] . . . is made of relationships with other people and the
38
world of objects.” Thus, an individual’s personhood is embodied or
constituted, at least in part, “in terms of ‘things,” and “[m]ost people
possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These
objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of
the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the
39
world.”
In experiments that have received little attention in the legal
40
literature, developmental psychologists have found empirical support
for Radin’s philosophical thesis that individuals have a psychological
32. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology
591–92 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., Philosophical Library, Inc. 1956) (1943).
33. G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right § 51, at 81 (Allen Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820) (emphasis added).
34. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
35. Id.
36. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897) (emphasis added).
37. See generally Radin, supra note 30.
38. Id. at 967.
39. Id. at 958–59.
40. One exception is a passing reference by Nestor M. Davidson in Property and Identity: Vulnerability
and Insecurity in the Housing Crisis, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 119, 133 (2012).
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connection with, and conceive of themselves through, their rights. As
these experiments have found, individuals perceive a link between
themselves and their property in both an intellectual and affective
manner; they feel and believe that the target of ownership is theirs.
Further, there is an affective or emotional sensation that accompanies
this state. Depending on the context, individuals emphasize an affective
sense of ownership—a “feeling” of ownership—or cognitive ownership—
42
an intellectual understanding that they own the object.
Research in this area centers around the concept of self-anchoring—
the idea that when something is associated with the self, one’s affective
attitude or emotional outlook toward it is reflected from or “anchored”
by that which one holds toward oneself. As recent research reveals,
owned objects are anchored in oneself and therefore judgments of owned
objects correspond to judgments of self to a greater extent than that of
unowned objects. Thus, in one recent experiment, researchers discovered,
using implicit association testing, that (1) choosing an object was sufficient
to create an affective link between the object and the individual—testing
revealed that the object would be linked to words denoting oneself; (2)
objects that were chosen were evaluated differently than objects that
were rejected; and (3) evaluations of objects that were chosen mirrored
43
evaluations of self-esteem. Thus, “[a]ssociative self-anchoring can be
understood as the formation of an association between an object and the
self, leading to a subsequent transfer of already existing self-associations
44
to the object.”
Developing these relationships with property or rights helps serve
various functions. Jon Pierce, one of the foremost cognitive psychologists
who write on the topic, has performed a meta-analysis of studies of the
functions ownership serves. He concludes that a sense of ownership of
rights in something (not necessarily tangible) helps individuals obtain a
45
sense of potency and control by being able to affect their environment.
As one writer observes, to the extent the degree of control resembles
that which an individual feels for her body, it contributes to a sense of
46
47
efficacy. Consumer research shows that possession also helps establish

41. Jon L. Pierce & Iiro Jussila, Psychological Ownership and the Organizational Context:
Theory, Research, Evidence, and Application 16, 19 (2011); see generally Leon Litwinski, The
Psychology of “Mine,” 22 Phil. 240 (1947).
42. Linn Van Dyne & Jon L. Pierce, Psychological Ownership and Feelings of Possession: Three Field
Studies Predicting Employee Attitudes and Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 25 J. Organizational
Behav. 439, 442 (2004).
43. See generally Bertram Gawronski et al., I Like It, Because I Like Myself: Associative Self-Anchoring
and Post-Decisional Change of Implicit Evaluations, 43 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 221 (2006).
44. Id. at 223–24.
45. Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 39–40.
46. Lita Furby, Possessions: Toward a Theory of their Meaning and Function Throughout the Life
Cycle, 1 Life-Span Dev. & Behav. 297, 322–23 (P. B. Baltes ed., 1978).
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identity, allowing individuals to express themselves and communicate
48
their self-perception to society. Identities and social roles are formed
through narratives. In these “self-narratives, consumers play out their
identities as a kind of performance on the stage of life, with products as
49
props in the enactment of personalized version of cultural script.”
Further, individuals absorb meaning from the objects they possess—as
most midlife crises would suggest, they ascribe to themselves meanings
50
that society may attach to the objects they own. Future expectations and
narratives regarding objects are important to developing a sense of self
51
and even of identity.
But even more than answering the identity-related question of who
one is, connections to property help prove that one is, that is, that one
exists as an independent human being separate from the collective. As
some scholars explain using theories borrowed from developmental
psychology, the concept of ownership helps children differentiate between
52
self and the world. As they develop, they learn to separate the self from
53
the rest of the world. As part of this process, children begin to separate
the objects associated with themselves from the objects associated with
others, extending these ideas over time to ownership of abstract concepts
54
such as rights or intellectual property. Different cultural understandings
of what can be possessed and what possession means can result in
55
different ways of understanding oneself and one’s community.
Both Radin’s theory and empirical work show that some objects
play a greater role in developing personhood, and some a lesser, depending
on context. As Radin explains, “the personhood perspective generates a
hierarchy of entitlements: the more closely connected with personhood,
56
the stronger the entitlement.” At one end may be commercial interests
such as the right one has in possession and alienation of money or goods
a shop owner may hold for sale. At the other end are rights very close

47. Russell W. Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. Consumer Res. 139, 144–45 (1988);
Banwari Mittal, I, Me, and Mine—How Products Become Consumers’ Extended Selves, 5 J. Consumer
Behav. 550, 557 (2006).
48. Belk, supra note 47, at 41.
49. Mittal, supra note 47, at 553.
50. Helga Dittmar, The Social Psychology of Material Possessions: To Have Is to Be 54 (1992).
51. See, e.g., Aaron C. Ahuvia, Beyond the Extended Self: Loved Objects and Consumers’ Identity
Narratives, 32 J. Consumer Res. 171, 171–72 (2005).
52. Leon Litwinski, Is There an Instinct of Possession, 33 British J. Psych. 28, 34 (1942).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 34. This is, for me, the best explanation of why we feel connections to objects. But the
causes for owner-object linkages are, admittedly, debated. Some point to biological causes based on
anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 34–35. Of course, others argue that a
combination of biology and development help shape our understanding of ownership. Dittmar, supra
note 50, at 23–34.
55. Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985).
56. Radin, supra note 30, at 986.
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and personal to the individual, which range from interests in family
heirlooms to rights in body parts and the right to certain basic freedoms,
among others.
What determines this “hierarchy”? Predictably, objects that are
more entangled with our sense of identity and narrative of ourselves, our
past and future, are more important to us. The foremost determinants are
the degree of control over and, in Locke’s story, the investment of one’s
57
own resources into, something. Physical proximity makes a difference: if
“you now control” something, you are more likely to feel connected to it,
58
at least at that point in time. Hegel in turn argued that physical
59
“occupancy . . . is requisite.” Physical occupancy or control, however, is
just one of several reasons an individual may feel invested in an object.
Researchers have found that individuals can develop connections
through a variety of narratives to intangible rights or objects. Habitual
60
and constant use of a right is more likely to increase its perceived value.
Similarly, as we come to know something and obtain more information
about it, the more intimate the connection between the individual and
61
the thing becomes, and the more wiling we are to invest in the object.
62
Legal ownership—or perceived legal ownership —similarly creates
a powerful connective narrative about how the object or right plays a role
in an individual’s life. Pierce and his co-authors explain,
[L]egal ownership may facilitate and speed up the emergence of
psychological ownership, because it allows the individual to explore the
. . . routes leading to this state. . . . [The] [l]ack of legal ownership may
in some cases provide a more precarious form of ownership, in that an
individual has to avoid violation of the law (e.g., physical barriers,
customs, and social practices) [in order] to exercise one or more of the
three routes to psychological ownership. In the absence of legal ownership,
one may also have to contend with a greater fear of separation, claim of
63
ownership by the legal owner, and loss of the object.

This insight, that law provides an important narrative through which
individuals understand a right as being connected to and constituting
themselves, will prove crucial in later Parts.

57. Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 122; Furby, supra note 46, at 331.
58. Radin, supra note 30, at 968 (emphasis added).
59. Hegel, supra note 33, § 51, at 81 (emphasis added).
60. Pierce & Jussila, supra note 41, at 79.
61. James K. Beggan & Ellen M. Brown, Association as a Psychological Justification for Ownership,
128 J. Psychol. 365, 376–77 (1994).
62. Remember, I do not claim that the perception of an embedded right means that the state will
recognize the right as embedded.
63. Jon L. Pierce et al., The State of Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century
of Research, 7 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 84, 96 (2003).
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B. Taking Away Embedded Rights
Because the self is related to or constituted by objects, obtaining
control over a certain object means that a bond is formed, and taking
away an item that is owned imposes a greater burden than taking away
an item that is not owned. Few of the philosophers and social scientists
discussed in the previous Subpart examine the question of revocation of
the right to which the individual is connected. However, those that do,
predict that loss of these objects we control causes a “partial annihilation
64
of self.” Even if the object or right itself is not important, an attack on
ownership can be understood as an attack on self-sovereignty.
Because of the failure of connectedness theorists to focus on
revocation, a better perspective could be gained from considering
behavioral economics research conducted on the question of revocation
of objects. Starting in the 1980s, behavioral economists observed that in
many situations, individuals demanded more to give up a good they
already owned than they were willing to give to obtain a good they did
65
not yet own. This “endowment effect” had massive implications for
legal theory—if it correctly predicted preferences, it could affect laws
ranging from creditor repossession rights to employment insurance
66
policies. Almost twelve hundred law review articles used the term
67
“endowment effect” between 1990 and 2012.
Endowment effect research progressed independently of the
ownership theory research discussed in the previous Subpart. While the
connectedness theorists developed a theory of ownership but did not
focus on questions of revocation, endowment effect empiricists observed
the effects of revocation without developing a clear theory of ownership.
Thus, endowment effect researchers have struggled to determine what
causes the effect. Most scholars have traditionally associated the
endowment effect with a psychological phenomenon they call “loss
aversion,” according to which individuals weigh losses more heavily than
68
potential gains. Yet, the loss aversion theory itself appears to beg the
question why individuals value losses more than gains. The legal
literature has also pointed to other causes for the endowment effect, but
has strangely failed to consider a connectedness account of ownership. In
a recent paper, Gregory Klass and Kathryn Zeiler note that the effect
remains unexplained, and radically suggest that the effect does not exist
because of some independent overvaluation of already endowed objects;

64. See, e.g., Belk, supra note 47, at 143.
65. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228 &
n.3 (2003).
66. Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and
Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 2, 19 (2013).
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 4.
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rather, individuals claim to value endowed objects more to gain a
bargaining advantage (when they are sellers) or to satisfy authority
69
figures’ suggestion that they should value the object more. Notably, for
evidence of this claim, Klass and Zeiler rely on experiments in which
individuals were prevented from holding the good or were told that they
70
did not own the good.
But if anything, Klass and Zeiler’s work suggests that the explanation
for the endowment effect lies in the connection account of ownership.
According to their experiments, heightened valuation of the good
disappeared precisely when the link between the individual and the good
was deemphasized, either by telling the individual that the good was not
71
owned by them or by taking it away from the individual. As explained
above, when an ownership link is created between an object and oneself,
the object begins to “reflect” the individual. At the outset, researchers find
72
that an individual generally has positive associations with oneself. Objects
in which the self is “anchored” have a concomitantly magnified value
than objects that are not. And delinking the object from the individual,
as Klass and Zeiler did, will result in a devaluation of the object.
Empirical work supports this hypothesis. In a 1992 study that was
mostly overlooked by the legal and endowment effect literatures, James
Beggan conducted research that suggests that owners value their objects
73
more than nonowners in order to enhance self-value. Beggan deliberately
eschewed the term “endowment effect” for various theoretical reasons
and argued that ownership theory better explains the phenomenon.
Beggan’s work was not replicated until recently, where, using the theory
of self-anchoring that has developed since Beggan, researchers argue that
positive evaluations of objects are anchored in positive evaluations of
74
self. Individuals therefore experience deprivation of already-owned
objects as more harmful than a failure to provide the object in the first
place.
Finally, the factors outlined above that determine how connected an
object is to a person have been found to determine the extent of the
75
endowment effect. For example, Radin hypothesizes that “a relationship
between person and thing is stronger when resources are bound up with the

69. Id. at 40–41; see Korobkin, supra note 65, at 1248 (suggesting additional causes).
70. Klass & Zeiler, supra note 66, at 40–41.
71. Id.
72. Anthony G. Greenwald & Shelly D. Farnham, Using the Implicit Association Test to Measure
Self-Esteem and Self-Concept, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1022, 1026 (2000).
73. James K. Beggan, On the Social Nature of Nonsocial Perception: The Mere Ownership Effect,
62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 229, 231 (1992).
74. Jochen Reb & Terry Connolly, Possession, Feelings of Ownership and the Endowment Effect,
2 Judgment & Decision Making 107, 107 (2007).
75. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
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individual than when they are free to be traded or held for trade.” In the
endowment effect context, experiments have shown that objects held for
trade exert a lesser endowment than objects entwined with an individual’s
77
sense of self.
78

C. An Alternative Conception of Ownership

It is important to note that this account of ownership as connectedness
is contingent on context—it is only one, and today, probably not even the
primary account of rights ownership under the Constitution. Rights can
be conceived of in a way that ignores the fact that they are embedded in,
connected to, and constitute an individual. Thus, on a distributive account
of ownership, for example, the ownership scheme is merely the objective
cartography of allotment under the law—who happens to own which
bundle of rights. Ownership remains whether or not the individual is
conscious of possessing the right.
Modern political theorists and constitutional scholars are primarily
concerned with a distributive theory of ownership—ownership describes
not what already constitutes an individual but what an ideal system of
justice allots to them. Distributive justice (Kantian, utilitarian, or otherwise)
will ultimately determine the ownership scheme; subjective experiences
of ownership are irrelevant. David Hume, who, in contradistinction to
Locke and Hegel, explains that property is not determined by what
naturally constitutes an individual, but what “the laws of justice” allot,
79
best represents this view. Those “who make use of the words property,
or right, or obligation, before they have explain’d the origin of justice . . .
80
are guilty of a very gross fallacy.”
Prominent political theorists therefore engage with questions of
ownership from this distributive point of view. John Rawls pointed to
81
“primary goods” that individuals possess in a just world; Martha
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen identify a list of basic capabilities that all
82
individuals should possess to engage in certain activities; Radin similarly
distinguishes between “fungible” goods and goods that are essential to
83
personhood. Notably, this account of ownership is not mutually exclusive
from an account focusing on the bond between the individual and the
76. Radin, supra note 30, at 982.
77. Korobkin, supra note 65, at 1239.
78. There may be even other accounts of ownership that I do not engage with in this Article, but
distinctions between theories of ownership are often determined by context.
79. David Hume, Hume’s Treatise of Morals and Selections from the Treatise of Passions
136 (Ginn & Co. 1893) (1751).
80. Id.
81. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 214–15 (1971).
82. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach 84 (2000); Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 45 n.19 (1992).
83. Radin, supra note 30, at 986.
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object—it simply takes more criteria into account. One can incorporate
the connectedness account of ownership into the distributive justice
account. Distributive justice can take into account the fact that there is a
relationship between goods and the individual already owning them, and
may give preference to the status quo for that reason.
Under the distributive approach, the key question in the legal context
is whether, under the scheme for distribution of rights dictated by the
Constitution, an individual should possess a right against the State. Plaintiffs
argue for the right to perform a certain activity—same-sex intimate conduct,
abortion, home schooling of children—not because the right cannot be
taken away once allotted to certain individuals, but rather because the
Constitution distributes those rights to all individuals. The distribution is
dictated, in part, by how important a right is and the countervailing
government interest: certain rights are deemed “fundamental” to our
constitutional tradition because they are constitutionally enumerated;
others because they are rooted in this nation’s history or are important to
84
an individual’s sense of autonomy; yet other allotments may improve
85
efficient social functioning or maintain social cohesion.
The key here is that distributive ownership does not (necessarily)
concern itself with whether the right is not provided in the first place or is
taken away post hoc. In substantive due process contexts, for example,
the Constitution is indifferent as to whether the right is being denied ex ante
(that is, without being ever bestowed) or taken away ex post (that is, after
possession). Any deviation from the optimum distribution—whether before
or after the right is possessed—is unconstitutional. While this is probably
the predominant theory of rights ownership in modern constitutional
doctrine, as the next Part will show, connectedness theories played an
important role as a historical matter.

II. Connectedness in Legal Doctrine
My examination of the revocation of endowed and embedded rights
continues by considering legal concepts that recognize the notion of
connectedness. Part II argues that the notion that rights, especially
property rights, become connected to an individual and embedded in her
blood has long been part of Anglo-American legal understanding. This
understanding appeared with the first discussion of rights as subjective
legal capabilities in the thirteenth century, and continued into early modern
America as legal doctrines such as attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of
blood demonstrate. Each of these doctrines relied on a connectedness
account of ownership.

84. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
85. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1978) (1739).
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Subpart B turns to the vested rights doctrine, which more squarely
presents the question of revocation. Although it is hard to apply, the
vested rights doctrine is not conceptually complicated. A vested interest
is a right that is fully realized and present as opposed to a mere expectation.
Any legislation that takes away a vested right is considered retroactive
86
and is disfavored or outright prohibited. This doctrine, which dominated
the nineteenth-century constitutional landscape, presents the clearest
87
example of hostility to rights revocation. Under the doctrine, a failure
to provide the right in the first place merits no constitutional scrutiny.
However, revocation of the right once vested (if even possible) demands
the accouterments of due process.
Many rights have historically been considered “vested,” including
non-property rights. For example, the California Supreme Court held
that the rights that attach to same-sex spouses for the couples that had
already married had vested and that Proposition 8 did not repeal these
88
rights. I argue in Subpart B that the determinants of whether a right has
vested, such as time, reliance, and completion of formalities, are meant to
measure how “connected” a right is to an individual. While the doctrine
has largely been the province of specialized areas of law such as zoning
and pensions, recent same-sex marriage cases have returned the doctrine to
the vanguard of constitutional litigation. I therefore turn to a closer analysis
of these cases.
I conclude in Subpart C by explaining that the considerations that
determine that a right has vested may be present in circumstances where
courts, for various reasons, decide not to invoke the doctrine. In such
cases, courts are still loath to permit rights revocation. Again, while this
is apparent across multiple areas of law, which I describe briefly, the
Affordable Care Act case is a prominent example of this principle.
A. Rights Connectedness in Legal History
In this Subpart I show that the Anglo-American legal tradition has
long treated some rights as somehow part of—and embedded in—an
individual. First, I examine the concept of “vesting.” The term is used
across vast historical periods. For the purposes of this Article, I simply
note that every major legal thinker that invokes the term uses it to
86. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 892 P.2d 497, 500 (Kan. 1995); see generally Peterson
v. City of Minneapolis, 173 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1969). James L. Kainen provides a detailed historical
discussion of the varied contexts in which the vested rights doctrine has been deployed in the Supreme
Court—land, financial payments, and commissions. See Kainen, supra note 18, at 421. My point is
simply that the Court’s investigation of vesting of a particular right (whatever the right is) has always
been carried out with an eye to whether the right can be taken away; once a state provides a right and
it vests in the recipient, attempts to take away that right are disfavored, or even outright prohibited.
87. The vested rights doctrine discussed in Part II.B draws on the same conceptual roots of
ownership-as-connectedness, but is distinct from the legal concepts and doctrines described in Part II.A.
88. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 120 (Cal. 2009).
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describe property as connecting to an individual. Similarly, other legal
doctrines, such as attainder or corruption of blood, also rely on the
notion of property as embedded within an individual. These concepts, while
rarely (if ever) invoked today, most clearly exemplify the connectedness
account of property, and hence bear some description. Underlying these
legal concepts was an understanding that property constituted who the
individual was, and that investing property in the individual, or divesting
it, could fundamentally alter that identity.
It is unclear to what extent the vested rights doctrine, which properly
deals with the question of revoking vested rights, can be directly traced
to these doctrines or concepts. Certainly, the legal concept of “vesting”
that describes an item of property as becoming closely connected to an
individual is closely related, and probably logically precedent, to the vested
rights doctrine, which prohibits taking away these closely connected
rights. However, given the range of historical periods across which the
concepts of “vestedness” appear, this Article does not seek to develop
this relationship any further. Suffice it to say all these doctrines are
conceptually related in that they consider property as embedded in the
individual. But doctrinally speaking, at least, they remain distinct concepts.
1.

“Vesting” of Property

Descriptions of rights as “vested,” and therefore becoming embedded
or connected to the individual, appear across historical periods. The
earliest discussions date back to the earliest days of English jurisprudence in
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, against a backdrop in which the term
“right” itself (ius) was in the process of being developed. Thus, in exploring
the concept of vesting in this context, it may be that we are discussing the
term with respect to something that is not quite fully understood as a
“right” in the modern sense. Nonetheless, the concept of vesting was
applied to the medieval analogs of rights—possession, obligations, and
powers.
Around 1100, the whole corpus of Roman law was recovered. Next
came an immensely influential codification of church law in Gratian’s
89
Decretum. These legal watersheds led to intense debates and important
90
developments in theories of rights of the time. The meaning of the term
91
“right” (ius) was ambiguous. Classically, the term ius denoted justice—
the moral code that determined right and wrong. However, around the
twelfth century, the term ius began to adopt its modern meaning, denoting

89. See Decretum Gratiani, in Gratian: The Treatise on Laws (Augustine Thompson trans., Catholic
Univ. of Am. Press 1993) (1151).
90. See generally Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights,
Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625 (1997) (“Civilis autem est quæ animo tantum retinetur.
Naturalis, quæ corpore, et aliquando iusta est et aliquando iniusta.”).
91. Id. at 45.
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subjective individual rights—“a faculty, an ability, a liberty to act” by the
92
individual. The Laws and Customs of England, by Henry Bracton, the
most prominent jurist of this time, provided the first known systematic
exposition of English law and contains one of the first examinations of
this new approach to the idea of “rights.” He noted that “ius” primarily
refers to an objective moral code, but secondarily that it also indicates
93
subjective individual rights, or “potestas.”
The concept of vesting, according to which a right became part of an
individual’s soul, was born concurrently with this new idea of rights. In
the property context, Bracton explained, “[p]ossession is divided into
94
civil and natural possession.” “Natural” ownership is purely a question
95
of “physical occupation.” Nothing more profound is at play. Thus, one
loses natural ownership at death, not at the time of death, but only “when
96
the body is borne away.” Civil ownership, by contrast, is connected to our
97
soul. “Civil [ownership] is . . . retained by the soul [animo] alone.”
Therefore, one “loses civil possession [at the time of death,] when the
98
soul [animus] quits the body.” Civil possession is therefore tied to the
soul, and is lost when the soul is no longer present.
The difference between natural and civil possession translates to a
difference between “bare” and “vested” possession. Bare possession is
simply the fact of physical (or natural) possession without consideration
99
of “right.” Vested possession is possession that is “clothed . . . by right,
100
title, or time.” Transfer of right or title occurs through formalities such
101
as livery of seisin.
As I explain in greater detail below, formalities and time determine
how connected a right or object is to an individual’s sense of self even
102
today. On Bracton’s account, they served a similar function. Formalities
are an outward manifestation of deeper psychological processes.
Formalities, to be sure, are “what is outward, in the light of external acts
103
and according to the sight and understanding of men.” But the
formalities reflect inner psychological bonds. They show that “the donor

92. Id. at 30.
93. Id.
94. 2 Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 122 (Samuel E. Thorne trans.,
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. 1998) (1235–1240), available at http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/
Common/SearchPage.htm.
95. Id. at 122.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 155.
99. Id. at 122 (“Item alia nuda, alia vestita. Nuda, ubi quis nihil iuris habet in re, nec aliquam iuris
scintillam, sed tantum nudam pedum positionem: vestita, iure, titulo, vel tempore.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 130.
102. See infra Part II.B.1.
103. 2 Bracton, supra note 94, at 130.
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. . . [lacks] the possessory state of mind,” and the donee takes the item
104
with the intent to possess. The formalities therefore reflect a transfer of
the psychological bond as well. Witnesses can testify to this, and that the
105
transfer was made “freely and of [the donor’s] own will.” Finally, even
without formalities, time similarly reflects a changed connection between
the object and its owner. “[L]ong possession, like a mother, gives birth to
106
right in the possessor.” Vesting here was tied to the state of one’s sole
or mind.
Bracton extended a similar analysis to contract law. An agreement
“is contracted [using] several vestments, [including] a thing [consideration],
107
by words, by writing, by consent, by traditio [, or] by conjunction.”
Without these, a right is not vested, and its violation cannot be remedied
108
through legal action. Each of these formalities helps indicate some
deeper bond between the object and its owner.
While I argue that the modern sense of vesting also has a
relationship to one’s soul or mind, Bracton’s use of the term is different
from how it is presently used. For Bracton, vesting was best understood
transitively—formalities indicating the state of the individual’s mind or
soul vested or clothed the right. There is no use of vesting in the
intransitive sense—of the right vesting in a person, as the term is more
commonly used today. Possibly, as a result of this limited understanding
of the term “vest,” and indeed, the novelty of using ius to indicate
subjective individual rights, the term “vested” was rarely used in the
period. Word searches of the first Year Books, which appeared around
this time and reported case proceedings before the Common Bench,
109
reveal that variations of the term “vest” were rarely used. Bracton’s
contemporary commentators rarely, if ever, used the term. Neither of the
110
more summary works known as Glanville or Fleta used the term.
Similarly, Britton—one of the first major thinkers after Bracton—
111
preferred the term “reposed” instead of “vested.”
As time progressed, however, the term gradually saw increased
usage, along with a subtle change in meaning—but one that still indicated
connectedness to an individual. Rights were mostly invoked in the
context of property; courts would commonly refer to estates as being in

104. Id. “Animo possidendi.” In modern usage, this would translate to the intent of possessing.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 157.
107. Id. at 283–84.
108. Id. at 45.
109. Yearbook of the Reign of King Edward the First Years XX & XI (Alfred J. Horwood ed.
& trans., 1866). These variations included vest, veste, vestu, vesti, vestire, vester, vestier, vesty, vestira,
vestiras, vestera. See generally id. As late as 1292 or 1293, the term does not appear in the Year Book
of that period. Id.
110. A Translation of Glanville (John Beames ed., 1812).
111. 1 Britton 212, 342 (Francis Nichols ed. & trans., Clarendon Press 1865).
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(“en”) a person. Slowly, the term “vested” began to make an appearance in
112
the Year Books during the course of the fourteenth century. But its use
remained rare. When Thomas Lyttleton, another prominent jurist, wrote
his Treatise on Tenures (arguably the first textbook on property law) in the
fifteenth century, he used (when not quoting from elsewhere) a variation of
“vest” less than ten times, far preferring the term “invest” with property
113
or benefices. Coke, the next major legal expositor of private law, used
the term less than thirty times across the various volumes of his work in
114
the seventeenth century.
This dwarfs the over one hundred times that William Blackstone
used the term “vest” in his Commentaries that were published in the
115
following century. Notably, Blackstone became the first widely read
commentator whose work survives today that hinted at a more detailed
understanding of the term “vesting” since Bracton. Blackstone explained
that vesting property rights relied on the fiction of feudal investiture.
Under that fiction, “all lands were originally granted out by the sovereign,
116
and are therefore holden, either mediately or immediately, of the crown.”
The land was granted directly or indirectly “by the ceremony of corporal
117
investiture, or open and notorious delivery of possession.” And the
modern day freehold which requires the “ceremony” of livery of seisin
for conveyance “by the course of the common law . . . is the same as the
118
fe[u]dal investiture.”

112. For example, by the middle to the end of the century, the term began to be used on average
once per every 100 pages of the Year Books. See Year Books of Richard II: 12 Richard II, A.D.
1388–1389 (George F. Deiser ed., 1914); Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the Third Year
XX (First Part) (Luke Owen Pike ed. & trans, 1908); Year Books of the Reign of King Edward
the Third, Years XI and XII (Luke Owen Pike ed. & trans., 1885).
113. Thomas Littleton, Anciennes Loix des François, Conservées Dans les Coutumes
Angloises (M. Houard ed., 2nd ed. 1769).
114. 1 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; Or, a Commentary
upon Littleton (Charles Butler ed., 1985) (1628) [hereinafter Coke, First Part]; Edward Coke, The
Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642)
[hereinafter Coke, Second Part]; Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England; Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1644) [hereinafter Coke, Third Part]; Edward Coke, The Fourth
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1648) [hereinafter Coke, Fourth Part].
115. One possible explanation for this increased usage is that the term “vested” was more commonly
used in English, and of all these authors, Blackstone was the first to write in English. Another possibility
is that individuals had become more comfortable with the use of rights language—so much so that some
historians believe that the understanding of rights as subjective attributes of the individual originated
only in the seventeenth century. See, e.g., Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin
and Development 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (1979).
116. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *53.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *104. Blackstone possibly overplays the role of the “investiture” fiction in the imagination
of popular jurists; it is notable that Lyttleton, who preceded Blackstone by nearly two centuries, was far
more comfortable using the term invest and investiture to discuss the conveyance of property than vesting.
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But obtaining, and perhaps more importantly retaining and passing
on, property through feudal investiture is grounded in aspects of identity
that are more fundamental than mere economic gain. At the outset,
obtaining property in Blackstone’s world fundamentally altered an
individual’s social standing and the sets of rights and obligations that
came with it. The investiture ceremony required “an oath of fealty,” and
a “professing, that ‘[the grantee] did become [the lord’s] man, from that
119
day forth, of life and limb and earthly honour.’” In the religious context,
vast amounts of property were held by the church. Much litigation in the
common law courts surrounded the livings that came with certain vicar or
120
the “clerk . . . [must] be
rector positions. To obtain the living,
121
instituted.” This institution was an “investiture,” not just of the land,
but “of the spiritual part of the benefice: for by institution the care of the
122
souls of the parish is committed to the charge of the clerk.” Vesting of
property on Blackstone’s account therefore was connected to broader
aspects of social role. It determined an individual’s social status. It
represented loyalty, and connected the individual to a community.
Blackstone frequently treated property interests as living within an
individual—the right “abides” or “resides” in a person, and the “ultimate
123
property of the lands is in himself.” Indeed, the right needs a person
within which to reside. Unless such a person exists, the right cannot
transfer:
For, unless the freehold passes out of the grantor at the time when the
remainder is created, such freehold remainder is void: it cannot pass
out of him, without vesting somewhere; and in the case of a contingent
remainder it must vest in the particular tenant, else it can vest nowhere
124
....

But once an actual person exists, and the right is vested, the right “shall
125
not afterwards be taken from him.”
Even though Blackstone’s understanding of vesting differs from that
of Bracton’s, like Bracton, he was quite clear in distinguishing between
these vested rights and the “mere right of property,” which is analogous
to Bracton’s concept of “bare” possession. And as in Bracton, formalities
determine whether a right fully vests. As he repeatedly reminded, us in
different contexts ranging from avowdsons to freeholds, mere “nomination

119. Id. at *53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Cf. id. at *242 (without which confirmation and investiture, the elected bishop could neither
be consecrated nor receive any secular profits).
121. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *389.
122. Id. at 390.
123. 2 Blackstone, supra note 116, at *197.
124. Id. at *171.
125. Id. at *128.
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126

and institution” or “mere words” are insufficient; “material ceremon[ies]”
127
such as actual entry or livery of seisin determines whether the right vests.
It is only when a right vests that it is absorbed into the being and
blood of an individual that “makes a man complete owner; so as to
128
transmit the inheritance to his own heirs.” Once formalities such as
“corporal investiture and livery of seisin” are complete, they “give[] the
tenant so strong a hold of the land, that it never after can be wrested from
129
him during his life.” And of course, in the case of incorporeal interests,
other formalities apply to distinguish between “a vague and indeterminate
right” and a title vested by “the verdict of the jurors, and judgment of the
130
court.” What remained remarkably stable across the centuries during
which the understanding of vestedness changed was the relationship
between vestedness and personhood.
2.

Pre-American Accounts of Blood Ownership

In describing the vesting of property, Blackstone also referred to the
related question of corruption of blood. As he explained, the violation of
the oath taken during the investiture ceremony transforms the individual
herself. With the “commission of any felony,” for example, “the fe[u]dal
covenant and mutual bond of fealty are held to be broken” and “blood of
131
the tenant . . . is corrupted and stained.” As a result, “the inheritable
quality of [the felon’s] blood is extinguished and blotted out for ever. . . .
In consequence of which corruption and extinction of hereditary blood,
132
the land of all felons would immediately revest in the lord . . . .”
According to Blackstone’s metaphor, the tenant’s ability to hold
property is fundamentally grounded in the tenant’s blood. Upon the
commission of a crime of sufficient import, “the blood of the tenant
being utterly corrupted and extinguished, it follows, not only that all that
he now has should escheat from him, but also that he should be incapable
133
of inheriting any thing for the future.”
The corruption of blood metaphor appears at length only in the
work of early modern (that is, postmedieval) commentators. This work
demonstrates how, for these writers at least, property ownership rights
were linked to fundamental aspects of an individual’s being. Medieval
writers focused on the “contractual aspects” of vassalage that were common
to their time, and the breaking of an oath was simply understood as a

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at *312.
Id. at *311.
Id. at *312.
Id. at *386–87.
Id. at *438.
Id. at *252.
Id.
Id. at *253.
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134

violation of the contract. Glanville recognized forfeiture as the result of a
violation of the contract between the lord and the tenant, but never
135
treated it as an issue of the “corruption” of the blood. Similarly,
Bracton noted that property is forfeit to the lord simply because the
individual violated his contract with the lord by committing a crime—his
passing reference to heirs also not being able to inherit property as the
“seed and blood” of the oath breakers is a far cry from Blackstone’s
136
detailed assessment of the “heritable quality” of the tenant’s blood.
Britton similarly referred in passing to attainder with no reference to the
corruption of blood, though at least one of his translators made that
137
leap.
Historical events of the late fifteenth century, however, birthed what
appears to be the first theory of property that embedded ownership in an
individual’s blood accompanied by an understanding that if the blood
became corrupted, the property was lost. Before the fifteenth century, only
courts could impose attainder or corruption of blood pursuant to a judicial
sentence. There was also little controversy over the effect and purpose of
attainder; any confusion that existed over the process and varieties of
treason that could justify royal attainder was largely resolved in the Grand
138
Statute of Treason in 1352. However, in the fourteenth century, during
the War of the Roses, “when the alternations of conflict placed in power
one government after another,” attainder for treason was imposed
139
increasingly broadly and with greater frequency. More importantly, to
guarantee speedy retribution, this attainder was imposed not by judges,
but by Parliament. In light of these developments, instigators of the
process were at pains to justify it “with as much appearance of legality as
140
possible.”
In this context, later-Chief Justice Fortescue and others, as members
of Parliament, exerted “the ‘most vengeable labour’” in defense of
141
attainder. Fortescue had to walk a fine line—on one hand, he had to
assure his king’s supporters that the collection, preservation, and
inheritance of property, even against monarchs’ whims, were secure. At
the same time, under certain circumstances, he sought to show that
attainder was appropriate. In achieving this goal, Fortescue anticipated
Locke, tracing the origin of property to God’s injunction to Adam “[i]n

134. Frank W. Harris, The Law & Economics of High Treason from its Feudal Origin to the Early
Seventeenth Century, 22 Val. L. Rev. 81, 83–84 (1977).
135. A Translation of Glanville, supra note 110, at 189.
136. 2 Bracton, supra note 94, at 366.
137. 1 Britton, supra note 111, at 37.
138. John G. Bellamy, The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages 89–102 (2004).
139. J.R. Lander, Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453 to 1509, 4 Hist. J. 119, 120 (1961).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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142

the sweat of thy brow thouh shalt eat bread.” This, Fortescue argued,
showed that man gained a property interest in items for which he
expended labor. Property
compensates for the sweat by which the body of the acquirer is
enfeebled, . . . [to] compensate the damage resulting from his loss of
bodily wholeness . . . thus the property takes the place of the man’s
bodily integrity, which he has lost, and coheres as an accident to the
143
toiler.

The property then “accompanies a man’s blood” and is “united to him”
upon his expenditure of labor. In effect, because his blood carries through
144
to his heir, the property may also pass down to his heir.
While the novelty of Fortescue’s theory has been celebrated as the
145
first of a labor, blood-based theory of property, historians have
overlooked that the theory had a polemical purpose. Fortescue played an
146
important role in the widespread attainders of 1459. What historians
refer to as Fortescue’s “innovative” and “distinctive” blood theory of
147
property developed during the 1460s was developed precisely to allow
Fortescue to provide a convincing explanation of disinheritance by
attainder. He explained that by attainder, the convict’s “blood is forthwith
adjudged by that law to be so corrupted that, although by the prince’s
favour he escape death, he nevertheless will not be capable henceforth of
succeeding his parents in their inheritances, nor will any of his posterity
148
succeed him in his inheritance.” Fortescue, rather than the champion of
149
property rights that historians take him to be, was quite the opposite.
Like his better known writings, Fortescue’s property theory is better
understood as polemical, grounding the corruption of blood explanation
of attainder and forfeiture.
The success of this theory is reflected in the heavy reliance on the
corruption of blood metaphor by subsequent writers. Early modern
treatises focused far less on contractual language. For the treatise
150
authors, a crime defined the individual as corrupt through and through.
Thus, according to Coke, attainder rendered one “ignoble,” and resulted

142. 1 John Fortescue, On the Law of Nature, in The Works of Sir John Fortescue 291 (Thomas
Fortescue Lord Clermont ed., Chiswick Press 1869) (1486).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Edwin Callahan, Blood, Sweat, and Wealth: Fortescue’s Theory of the Origin of Property,
17 Hist. of Pol. Thought 21, 23 (1996).
146. Lander, supra note 139, at 120.
147. 1 Christopher Pierson, Just Property: A History in the Latin West, Volume One: Wealth,
Virtue, and the Law 126 (2013); Callahan, supra note 145, at 27 n.28.
148. 1 Fortescue, supra note 142.
149. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 145, at 28.
150. A detailed exposition is beyond the scope of this Article.
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151

in the forfeiture of property.
Francis Bacon provided a similar
152
exposition. Hale mentioned it around fifty times across his two volumes
153
on the History of the Pleas of the Crown.
This is not to say that the contractual aspects of Bracton’s theory are
lost—they remain, and explain why the estate is forfeited for small
offenses such as making improper grants of the property. But corruption
of blood occurs upon the commission of greater offenses. Property is
understood as being absorbed into the blood of the individual who held
it. When that blood is corrupted, the property is lost. This concept carried
over into the United States, where jurists approached questions of property
ownership as implicating the blood and being of the owner.
3.

Blood Ownership in Nineteenth Century America

The corruption of blood and related doctrines, which treated
property as somehow embedded in the blood of an individual, continued to
play a prominent role in American property law until legislatures began
statutory reform in the late nineteenth century. However, until then,
corruption of blood played an important role in three sets of cases. The
first set of cases date back to the early nineteenth century, as the United
States dealt with the consequences of transitioning from British rule to
self rule. The next cases arose when former slaves sought to hold or pass
on property. The third and most enlightening involve confiscation of
enemy property after the Civil War. All of these contexts show how deeply
the blood-ownership metaphor was embedded in American property law.
a. British Ownership in Postcolonial America
After American independence, few areas of law presented more
154
vexing questions than questions of inheritance. On the one hand,
hostility to their former enemy made legislators wary of permitting British
subjects to own property—and indeed, under the common law, an alien
could not inherit or devise property; legislatures passed and then
155
repealed statutes permitting inheritability. On the other hand, citizens
had close personal and economic ties with relatives in Britain, making
the ability to pass on property important.

151. 3 A Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute of the Laws of England 447
(J.H. Thomas, ed., Alexander Towar 1836) (1818). See Coke, First Part, supra note 114, at xc, 53, 107;
Coke, Second Part, supra note 114, at 68; see generally Coke, Third Part, supra note 114.
152. Francis Bacon, Elements of the Common Laws of England: Branched into a Double
Trial 49 (Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1630).
153. See generally 1 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Prof’l Books
Ltd. 1971) (1736).
154. See generally Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen
Property Rights, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 1 (2013).
155. See id. at 4.
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The Supreme Court faced the question of alien inheritability in a
trio of important cases in the early part of the century, with Justice
Johnson penning the key opinions. Johnson, it should be noted, explicitly
understood property vesting as imbuing in the individual. As he famously
noted in Fletcher v. Peck, explaining that land that Georgia had granted
could not be summarily divested by a subsequent enactment—the
property right once “vested in the individual; becomes intimately blended
with his existence, as essentially so as the blood that circulates through
156
his system.”
In the alienage cases, which the Court heard and judged at the same
time, Johnson took as given this understanding of property ownership. In
the first case, M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, the Court took the rare step of
“publishing the arguments of counsel” separately from its opinions
(which came a few years later) because of the “importance and interesting
157
nature of the questions involved.” The following year, the Court
158
extensively published arguments in Lambert’s Lessee v. Paine. In both
cases, counsel, arguing against alien inheritability, relied on the common
law rule that aliens lack “inheritable blood.” But at the same time,
counsel had to reckon with the fact that American citizens would
potentially inherit and devise land in Britain, even as they denied that
the British could inherit or devise American land. Accordingly, they
made an ingenious argument: Americans born during British rule were
born imbued with allegiance to the King. Under English common law, this
allegiance could not be renounced. Consequently, British-born American
subjects had a “common bond” that “connect[ed] the inheritable blood”
between them and their British ancestors, allowing them to “inherit
159
[from] British subjects.” But the inverse was never true—after the
American Revolution, “British subjects, not in this country at that time,
never owed allegiance” to the United States, and “therefore, they [could]
160
have no inheritable blood as to lands in this country.” The court punted
in both of these cases. In the M’Ilvaine opinion, written by Justice Johnson,
161
the Court held that the inheritor was an American subject. In Paine,
162
the Court held that the devisee did not intend for the alien to inherit.
The Court finally engaged with the question in Dawson’s Lessee v.
Godfrey, where Justice Johnson explicitly recognized that while preRevolution born Americans could inherit from British subjects, the reverse

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

10 U.S. 87, 143 (1810).
6 U.S. 280, 280 n.† (1805).
See 7 U.S. 97 (1805).
Id. at 114.
Id.
M’Ilvaine, 6 U.S. at 297.
Paine, 7 U.S. at 129–30.
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was not true because British subjects lacked American inheritable blood.
Lower courts recognized a corollary of this rule: because of the lack of
inheritable blood, the property could never vest in, and therefore, could
not pass through, an alien.
Where a person dies, leaving issue, who are aliens, the latter are not
deemed his heirs-in-law, for they have no inheritable blood, and the
estate descends to the next of kin, who have an inheritable blood, in
164
the same manner as if no such alien issue were in existence.

Finally, even if a person naturalized, property could vest in their blood only
from that time forth; they could not claim to have inherited property before
165
that time.
Legislatures, and, begrudgingly, the courts, later began to relax this
approach. The United States and Britain signed treaties loosening the
common law rule, and states adopted statutes permitting aliens to inherit,
166
which courts interpreted narrowly at first, but with increasing leniency
167
as the century progressed. In the Supreme Court, in turn, Justice
Johnson’s hard line approach—denying that property could vest in alien
blood—began to falter. In Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Story, reversed the Virginia Supreme
Court, holding that (what we would understand as) due process was
168
required before lands of an alien could be forfeited to the sovereign.
169
Justice Johnson dissented because of the “disability” in an alien’s blood.
Courts also frequently relied on the notion that property resided in
an individual’s blood in cases involving illegitimate children. One court
explained that an illegitimate child could “inherit nothing . . . [for she] has no
170
ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived.” Accordingly,
as the Court eloquently observed in an oft-quoted passage from Stevenson’s
Heirs v. Sullivant, when a child was illegitimate “[t]he current of inheritable
blood was stopt in its passage from, and through the mother, so as to
prevent the descent of the mother’s property and of the property of her
ancestors, either to her own illegitimate children, or to their legitimate
171
offspring.” Indeed, an illegitimate child could not inherit from his
legitimate offspring: “[P]arents must be found who shall be the actual or
163. 8 U.S. 321, 323 (1808). This was not always so in state courts, however. See Martin v. Brown,
7 N.J.L. 305, 339 (1799).
164. Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. 453, 461 (1819); see also Jackson v. Green, 7 Wend. 333 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1831).
165. Lee v. Smith, 18 Tex. 141, 141–42 (1856).
166. McCreery’s Lessee v. Somerville, 22 U.S. 354, 358 (1824); see also Spratt v. Spratt, 26 U.S. 343 (1828).
167. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879); Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U.S. 156 (1886).
168. 11 U.S. 603, 621 (1813). As Story explained, “It enables the owner to contest the question of
alienage directly . . . [and] affords an opportunity for the public to know the nature, the value, and the
extent of its acquisitions . . . .” Id. at 623.
169. Id. at 629 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
170. Blair v. Adams, 59 F. 243, 244 (C.C.D. Tex. 1893) (citations omitted).
171. 18 U.S. 207, 261 (1820).
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assumed fountain of inheritable blood, and create the kindred of
172
brothers.” Much like corruption of blood, illegitimacy cast a “legal taint
173
of blood” in the individual, which the legislature could correct.
Legislatures slowly, and not without controversy, began to pass statutes
permitting illegitimate children to inherit that, as one court vividly put it,
“injected into his veins inheritable blood in its most comprehensive
174
sense,” permitting illegitimate children to inherit. But, excepting certain
states, these statutes were narrow in their reach, and read narrowly by
175
the courts.
b. Slave Property Ownership
As states began to allow illegitimate children and aliens to inherit
property as the century progressed, the specter of blood ownership
remained but was invoked in different contexts to deal with the
176
repercussions of the Civil War. The first set of consequences courts had
to deal with involved the passage of property from former slaves to their
heirs. In the majority of these cases arising in southern courts, the courts
effectively held that the heir was illegitimate and therefore unable to
inherit, although their decisions were more nuanced. For example, in
Daniel v. Sams, the Florida Supreme Court explained that “slaves were not
competent to contract a marriage, the issue of which would have inheritable
177
blood.” Moreover, since slaves themselves did not have inheritable
blood, “any other person” could also not inherit from a slave, “and for
178
want of heirs at law their property would go to the State.”
The Alabama Supreme Court initially adopted a different approach,
relying on alienage rather than illegitimacy cases to limit the ability of
blacks to obtain property in the state. In 1875, the court was faced with a
179
difficult case involving the inheritance of children of former slaves. There
was no question that the children were legitimate since neither parent
180
was a slave at the time of marriage. Unable to claim that the children
were illegitimate, the court instead held that the children were aliens at
the time of their parents’ deaths because Alabama prohibited free blacks

172. Brewer’s Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. 178, 195 (1840).
173. Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283, 285 (1885).
174. Hicks v. Smith, 22 S.E. 153, 155 (Ga. 1895); see Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth:
Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 213 (1985) (referring in passing to this trend).
175. See, e.g., Dickinson’s Appeal, 42 Conn. 491, 511–12 (1875).
176. The trend was broader than the three cases described in Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law
of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 221 (1999).
177. 17 Fla. 487, 494 (1880); see Williams v. Kimball, 16 So. 783 (Fla. 1895).
178. Id.
179. Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411, 415–16 (1875).
180. Id. at 411–12.
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181

from residing in the state. The next year, the court overruled previous
182
cases that held that children of slave marriages were legitimate.
c.

Blood Ownership and Connectedness in the Post-Civil
War Confiscation Debates

The distinction between the theories of property I am expounding
came into sharp relief during the confiscation debates of the Civil War.
The debates and subsequent Supreme Court opinions toggled between
two views of property. The first—on which I have been focusing here—was
the traditional connectedness account of property, which President Lincoln
and the conservatives supported. On this account, an individual is connected
to his property; divestment can only occur if the individual somehow is
corrupted and can therefore no longer hold the property. And upon
divestment, the property right must reattach to some other individual or
entity. On the other account, advanced by the radicals, moderates, and later,
government lawyers, property ownership merely represented distributive
rules, as I outline in Part I.C. One may redistribute this property, and put
it to different uses, without engaging with broader metaphysical
questions of whether the blood of the original owner was corrupted, and
to whom the new property right attaches.
The debates began with the passage of the First and Second
Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862, which provided for the “permanent,
uncompensated seizure of all the real and personal property” of “all those
183
who recognized and supported the . . . Confederacy.” As Daniel
Hamilton details, the 1862 Act, which provided for, among other things,
the emancipation of slaves and convictions for treason, was controversial,
but its passage represented a compromise between coalitions of “radicals,”
184
“conservatives,” and “moderates.”
Radicals and moderates sought to confiscate the property of
185
confederates. However, conservatives argued that permanent property
seizure without trial violated the constitutional prohibition on corruption
of blood, as well as (relatedly) protections of vested property rights
186
protected by the due process clause. Both arguments were based on the
understanding that property is fundamentally embedded in personhood; for
property to become divested, there had to be some defect in personhood.
Radicals and moderates acknowledged that this represented the usual
understanding under which property was divested. Under that traditional

181. Id. at 415.
182. Cantelou v. Doe, 56 Ala. 519, 521 (1876).
183. Daniel W. Hamilton, Limits of Sovereignty: Property Confiscation in the Union and the
Confederacy during the Civil War 1 (2007).
184. Id. at 25–26.
185. Id. at 33–34, 60, 62, 72–74.
186. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572, 1754 (1862).
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view, the law would “corrupt the blood,” “destroy its inheritable
187
qualities,” or engage in “confiscation of property as a punishment for
188
the crime of its owner.” The traditional form of property confiscation
“did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem,” that is, to the owned object,
but rather, was the “part or consequence of the judgment of conviction
189
of the offender.” The loss of the object occurred solely because of the
link between the object and its owner—it was confiscated for no other
reason than because its owner was a criminal. “[T]he thing was then
primarily considered as the offender, and the offense was attached to
190
it.”
But radicals and moderates sought to construct a different
understanding of property—one where they could redistribute property
without considering the owner. Under this view, the law could get at
property without going through their owners, and indeed, without
acknowledging a bond between the owner and the property at all. Their
bill did “not pronounce judgment against any one,” it only “affect[ed]
191
property alone.” The radicals claimed their confiscation was different.
The confiscation they were urging had no ramifications upon the
individual’s personhood: “[T]he thing used in violating the law may be
192
seized and condemned without a judgment upon the guilt of the owner.”
This, they argued, was similar to confiscations in admiralty (prize) or
revenue cases where the property was seized and confiscated through
193
civil in rem proceedings without a judgment as to the owner’s guilt:
[I]f a man is trying to smuggle goods . . . [t]he goods are the instrument
of the wrong; and therefore . . . you may take and condemn the
thing . . . you do not give it a trial by jury, as when you proceed against
194
the man.

They relied on previous cases involving admiralty seizures of Confederate
195
naval cargo and British possessions. Their version of the bill required
the proceedings to conform to admiralty or revenue seizure proceedings
to maintain the fiction that property was being seized without attainting
196
the person of the offender.
Conservatives and the President agreed with the radicals that
traditional forfeiture attainted and branded the offender himself, and not
just his property. But that, they argued, was precisely what this bill

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 1875.
Id. at 1617.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1875.
Id. at 1617.
Id.
Id. at 1809.
Id.
Id. at 1875.
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achieved by permanently confiscating property. The theory the radicals
offered differed substantially from the vested rights approach to
property, which had come to characterize American jurisprudence, and
the conservatives refused to accept it. “I do not, I must confess,” said
Senator Joseph Wright, a Unionist from Indiana, “exactly see how you
can get at the property of the person by a proceeding against his estate,
197
when you must necessarily deal first with the person.” Senator
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi was even more blunt: “The idea of
punishment being attached to the offense or the offender’s property, is
198
Thus, to divest property, the
simply absurd and impossible.”
199
“proceeding in rem . . . ought to be a proceeding against a person.”
And, if by confiscating property, the Act branded the person himself,
then the bill was “monstrous” because it tarred all southern soldiers—
200
whether leaders or compulsory recruits—with the same brush. In this
way, the conservatives rejected a theory of property that did not conceive
of it as inextricably connected to the individual—even to the extent that the
in rem approach applied to certain circumstances, it was no longer good
law, belonging to “an age less enlightened than the present” and not
201
conducive to “modern usages.”
Finally, for President Lincoln and the conservatives, the key factor
that revealed the seizures to be corruption of blood was the following:
“[U]nder the Constitution upon a trial and conviction of a traitor you can
only take the life estate[;] these measures assume that without any trial
202
This operates as
or conviction you may take the fee simple.”
“corruption of the blood, or the forfeiture of the property of the offender
203
for a longer period than his life.” At the eleventh hour, President
Lincoln informed Congress that he would veto the Act unless it included
a resolution that the forfeiture was only for the life of the wrongdoer—
“it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the guilty parties,
whereas the Constitution . . . declares that no attainder of treason shall
work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the
204
205
person attainted.” Congress included the resolution.
The Supreme Court’s approach toward determining which theory of
property the in rem proceedings represented was schizophrenic. In
Armstrong’s Foundry, the United States argued that if a confiscatee

197. Id. at 1769–70.
198. Id. at 1761.
199. Id. at 1769.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1572, 1617.
202. Id. at 1617.
203. Id. at 1761.
204. President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress (July 17, 1862), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69771 (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Hamilton, supra note 183, at 106–07.
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received a pardon, he did not automatically retrieve the confiscated
206
property. Following the radicals, the government explained that the
207
pardon expunged any conviction of guilt that he had incurred. However,
208
it did not affect the property. In other words, because like the radicals,
the government assumed no bond between the property and its owner,
proceedings involving one did not affect proceedings regarding the other.
The Court, however, appeared to disagree and side with the conservative
view: it was “unable to concur in” the radical view and held that the
forfeiture concerned the person, not the thing. According to the Court,
“the statute regarded the consent of the owner to the employment of his
property in aid of the rebellion as an offence, and inflicted forfeiture as a
209
penalty.”
A mere three years later, however, in Miller v. United States, the
Court had to reckon with the constitutionality of the Act as a whole, and
had to squarely deal with the fact that the “penalty” it alluded to in
Armstrong was imposed without notice, trial by jury, or other
210
accouterments of due process. Ignoring Armstrong, the Court now
sided with the radicals on the issue:
[Confiscation] has no reference whatever to the personal guilt of the
owner of confiscated property, and the act of confiscation is not a
proceeding against him. The confiscation is not because of crime, but
because of the relation of the property to the opposing belligerent, a
relation in which it has been brought in consequence of its ownership.
It is immaterial to it whether the owner be an alien or a friend, or even
a citizen or subject of the power that attempts to appropriate the
property. . . . It treated the property as the guilty subject. . . . [and
211
therefore did not violate the] prohibit[ion on] bills of attainder.

And while the Act confiscated the property only of certain individuals
who provided certain kinds of aid to the enemy, “[p]ersons were referred
212
to only to identify the property.”
Miller’s approach would have been acceptable if property was
generally conceived of in its own right as separate from the individual.
However, as subsequent litigation would soon prove, the case was divorced
from background property law principles and left numerous questions
unanswered. In treating the Act as affecting only property, Miller ignored
the fact that these background principles took for granted that property
was enmeshed with the person. The basic issue that Miller (and the

206. 73 U.S. 766, 767 (1867).
207. Id. at 768.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 769.
210. 78 U.S. 268 (1870).
211. Miller, 78 U.S. at 305–06, 308, 312.
212. The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. 92, 105 (1873); see Semmes v. United States, 91 U.S. 21, 27
(1875) (noting trial for confiscation was independent of trial for treason).
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radical Senators) ignored was that background property principles rely
on a connectedness understanding and presume that the fee resides in
some holder. Accordingly, Miller failed to answer the question if the
property was confiscated, the question remained—who held the fee? If the
property was only temporarily confiscated during the owner’s life, and if
the confiscation did not reflect on the owner’s guilt or innocence, then,
some would answer, the owner. But the Court decided, in 1875, that the
fee did not reside in the owner and he could not sell future interests in
the property because congressional purpose would be “thwarted” if the
property remained “vested in the enemy’s adherent,”—there is nothing
213
“left in the person whose estate had been confiscated.” The Court still
214
refused to express an opinion as to “where the fee dwells.”
But such an answer could not satisfy background property principles,
and other questions soon arose. Heirs argued that if the fee resided in the
United States and not the original owner, then the debts of the owner did
not attach to the property—a position that the Court, somewhat
215
unsatisfactorily, rebuffed. More importantly, after the various rounds
of amnesty for former rebels were completed, survivors sought
reinstatement of property, pursuant to Armstrong.
The Court finally resolved these questions in Illinois Central
Railroad Company v. Bosworth, decisively concluding (along the lines of
216
Armstrong) that the Act did not separate property and the individual.
For, as the Court explained, if “[t]here is no corruption of blood[,] the
offender can transmit by descent . . . [and] his heirs take from him by
217
descent.” Accordingly, vesting of the property remained unaffected—
218
“the dormant and suspended fee . . . continues in” the original owner.
The task of the Court was difficult—even as it accepted the radical
conception of rebel property as free floating, capable of being guilty on
its own, it had to deal with traditional constitutional principles that treated
property as vested, as connected with someone, and that allowed
divestment and the rupture of this connection only upon a proper trial.
This traditional connectedness account required the Court to situate “the
disembodied shade of naked ownership . . . during the period of its
219
ambiguous existence” in something or someone. These property
interests “could not have been floating in space without relationship to

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 209, 211 (1875).
Id. at 211–12.
Avegno v. Schmidt, 113 U.S. 293 (1885).
133 U.S. 92, 103 (1890).
Id.
Id.
Bosworth, 133 U.S. at 101.
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220

any one.” The Court ultimately reaffirmed a connectedness account of
ownership.
The lesson to be taken from these cases then is this: Ownership of
rights resided in the individual; taking rights away once they were vested
fundamentally affected the individual and offended related constitutional
guarantees, and was therefore disfavored. Indeed, the vestedness concept
and the corruption of blood metaphor are not the only early modern
legal examples of the understanding of property as grounded in a
person’s being and existence. Changes in an individual’s being affected
their ownership of property. For example, after marriage, a husband and
wife became “one person in law, so that the very being and existence of
the woman is suspended during the coverture, or entirely merged and
221
incorporated in that of the husband.” This “unity of person” meant that
222
the property of the wife became “vested in the husband.” And if
changes in an individual’s personhood could affect the way in which he
owned property, then the reverse was true—the vesting of property could
work changes to intrinsic aspects of an individual. Thus, if a lord “granted
[a villein]” property, it implicitly gave freedom to the villein (or serf)
because such ownership “vests an ownership in him entirely inconsistent
223
with his former state of bondage.”
B. Doctrinal Aspects of Vestedness and the Connectedness
Approach to Ownership
The most prominent modern context in which courts explicitly
disfavor rights revocation is in the context of the vested rights doctrine.
The doctrine was once, as Edward Corwin famously put it, the basic
224
doctrine of constitutional law. Indeed, the doctrine made an appearance
225
in many blockbuster antebellum cases. Thus, in Marbury v. Madison,
the Court found that Marbury had “a vested legal right” in the office of
226
magistrate. In Kendall v. United States, which began the process of

220. Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 554 (1892).
221. 2 Blackstone, supra note 116, at *433.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *94.
224. Corwin, supra note 25. The idea of retroactivity played a central role in the constitutional
protection of property and contract rights before the late nineteenth century development of substantive
due process. See Kainen, supra note 18. See also Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law
in American Legal History, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 217, 218–19 (1984) (“[V]ested rights concerns [were] a major
theme in American constitutional adjudication. . . . Derived from natural law concepts and from the heritage
of seventeenth century English political debate—and then encapsulated in the contract clause—the vested
rights doctrine was an absorbing concern for the Supreme Court in the early history of the Republic.”).
225. 5 U.S. 137, 172 (1803).
226. “The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the
judicial authority.” Id. at 167. The question of vested rights in public offices received further examination in
subsequent cases. See Woolhandler, supra note 24, at 1031. See also Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery:
Why Did William Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?, 18 Const. Comment. 607 (2001).
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laying out the limits of presidential control over executive officers, one
argument advanced against following the President’s direction was that
227
vested rights would be lost. Ogden v. Saunders, the basis of all bankruptcy
228
law, held that these laws do not violate vested rights.
The doctrine is, in some measure, a successor to the vestedness
concept described in the previous Subpart, and perhaps a cousin of the
corruption of blood metaphor, both of which rely on the understanding
of ownership as connectedness. Rather than focus on the historical
229
evolution of the doctrine that scholars have attempted elsewhere, this
Article focuses on its analytical underpinnings. As this Article explains,
the doctrinal principles that distinguish vested rights from nonvested
rights aim to measure how connected a right is to the person who holds
it. At the outset, not every right is vested, of course—some rights are
insufficiently connected with and constitutive of the individual to be
considered vested. Courts generally express this point in similar ways—
according to one court, “a right has not vested until it is ‘so far perfected
that it cannot be taken away by legislation,’ and so ‘complete and
230
unconditional’ that it ‘may be equated with a property interest.’”
Similarly, as Chapman and McConnell argue, vested rights are “marked
by finality” and are “conclusively acquired,” as opposed to mere
231
expectations.
But what marks “finality,” “perfection” or “conclusiveness”? This is
a fraught question. Indeed, Kainen argues that this question proved so
problematic that courts backed away from the vested rights doctrine
232
altogether. To take Perry as an example, why could one not conclude
that the right to marry is so bound up with someone’s being that even for
unmarried individuals, the right to marry had already vested, just like the
relationships of couples that had already married? Under the case law,
vesting depends on three conditions: time, reliance, and completion of
formalities. As I discuss in the next Subpart, each of these criteria are
meant to measure the degree of connectedness between the individual
and the right. With the right amount of time, reliance, and completion of
formalities, the right becomes part of the individual.
Hence, once the right vests, it appears to become part of the individual,
no matter the legal regime. The right “travels” with the individual, even
if the law initially giving her the right is abrogated or is no longer in
227. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524 (1838). For the importance of Kendall, see Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–
1861, 117 Yale L.J. 1568 (2008).
228. 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
229. See, e.g., Kainen, supra note 18.
230. Dardeen v. Heartland Manor, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ill. 1999) (quoting First Co. v. Armstead,
664 N.E.2d 36, (Ill. 1996)).
231. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 20, at 1737.
232. Kainen, supra note 28, at 443–46.
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effect. Unlike substantive due process rights, as one court recently put it,
“[a] vested right may be derived from a statute or the common law, but
‘once it vests it is no longer dependent for its assertion upon the common
233
law or statute under which it may have been acquired.’” A change in
the distributive scheme of rights and benefits—as in the case of Proposition
8, which took the general right to marry away from same-sex couples—
leaves unaffected a vested right because the right is now embedded in the
individual who holds it. Thus vested rights historically also played a role
in conflict of laws analysis—when an individual with a vested rights travels
to a new jurisdiction with a different distributive scheme, they continue to
possess the right as if they were in the previous jurisdiction. Indeed,
scholars treat classical vested rights/retroactivity issues as raising inter234
temporal conflicts of laws.
1.

Doctrinal Criteria of Vestedness

Traditional vested rights in contract and property obtain when
formalities are complete. More recently, legislatures have imposed time
minimums—that is, an individual must hold an interest, in pensions for
235
example, for a certain period of time for it to vest. Finally, courts also
236
look to the reliance interests of the individual. Vested interests generally
obtain (when there are no contracts) when an individual relies on a right
over some period of time. Thus, individuals may invoke longstanding uses of
land to defend against rezoning, or invoke rights in statutes of limitations
237
against claims. All approaches relate to the degree of the connection
between an object and an individual.
The time based approach intuitively relates to how objects connect
to individuals. In most cases, the longer I possess an object, other factors
being equal, the more intertwined it becomes to my sense of being, and

233. City of Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285, 290 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Ficarra v. Dep’t of
Regulatory Agencies, Div. of Ins., 849 P.2d 6, 15 (Colo. 1993)).
234. See, e.g., Francis Wharton, Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism, 3 Int’l Rev. 50, 53
(1876) (“Laws may conflict not only because they emanate from rival sovereigns, each striving to
possess the particular case, but because they emanate from distinct periods of time, each of which may
claim to embrace the case in question within its sanctions.”); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,”
and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1191, 1194 (1987).
235. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 195 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining what
equities come into play when evaluating congressional purpose regarding vesting).
236. City of Elgin v. All Nations Worship Ctr., 890 N.E.2d 853, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[W]hen a
party expends substantial time and effort attempting to comply with an ordinance as it then exists and
the legislative body amends the ordinance, the party may acquire a vested right to proceed under the
old ordinance.” (citation omitted)).
237. Dane, supra note 234, at 1194 (statute of limitations defense is a vested right); 51 Am. Jur. 2d
Limitation of Actions § 17 (2015) (identifying property law’s special protection for existing uses,
exploring possible justifications for this protection, and arguing that none can support the strong protection
that existing uses currently enjoy); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use
Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1222 (2009).
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the harder it is for me to part with it. Similarly, (and relatedly), when I
rely on the fact that I possess an object or certain right, and use it on a
regular basis, it is more likely that I will consider it closely linked to me,
and imagine it as playing a role in future life projects and plans. Reliance
is also, therefore, a measure of the connection between the object and
the individual. A right or object that has played a sufficient role in an
individual’s life such that an individual has taken action based upon the
right is entitled to greater protection.
The formality based approach, however, requires more explanation.
Under this approach, a right vests only when the formalities are complete.
Some examples from the heyday of antebellum vested rights litigation
are instructive. In Marbury, for example, “certain solemnities [were]
required by law” including “the sign manual of the President, and the
238
seal of the United States,” for Marbury’s commission to vest. Similarly,
government land grants, the subject of Fletcher, typically required
239
formalities. Finally, existence of valid contractual rights requires certain
240
formalities be met. Even after the reach of the Court’s vested rights
doctrine diminished, these contract rights continued to be protected as
241
vested under the Contract Clause.
Although the conclusion is less intuitively apparent, like the time
and reliance based approaches, formalities also help “connect” the right,
or, in the case of property transfer, the object, with the promisee in three
ways: (1) causing the promisee to deliberate and cogitate over the benefits
of the bargain; (2) lending legal weight and legitimacy to the promisee’s
interest; and (3) recognizing the exercise of will, the autonomy, and
dignity of the promisee. Each of these aspects of formalizing the contract
buttress each other, although they are analytically distinct.

238. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 159–60 (1803).
239. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810). As the Court explained in Fletcher, certain legislative acts, such as
grants of land or charters to provide public services, were “in [their] nature[,] a contract,” such that “absolute
rights have vested under that contract, [and] a repeal of the law cannot devest those rights.” Id. Where
states enter into transactions—sales of land in Fletcher, or employment of officers, accompanied (at the
time) with bonds from sureties, as in Marbury, those transactions take on the role of bargained-for
contracts, which, due to their similarities with traditional contract, cannot be repudiated.
240. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941).
241. Kainen, supra note 28, at 431. Notably, however, the early antebellum cases did not invoke
the clause—as the scholarly debate and the judicial confusion suggests, the Court’s vested rights doctrine
does not admit of an easy textual explanation. Id. at 445.
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a. Deliberative Function
Lon Fuller, whose half-century-old article still remains a leading
242
authority on formalities in contract law, expanded on the deliberative
role they play. His focus, unlike mine, is on formalities from the point of
view of the party that takes on a burden. He (following others before
him) explained that when parties fit their behavior within legal formalities,
they “will tend also to make apparent to the party the consequences of
243
his action and will suggest deliberation where deliberation is needed.”
The purpose, ultimately, is to ensure that an individual takes on a
contractual burden after careful consideration. Similarly, another
contemporary article explained that the “ceremonial” aspects of a
transfer “impress[] the transferor with the significance of his statements
and thus justify[] the court in reaching the conclusion, if the ceremonial is
performed, that [the statements] were deliberately intended to be
244
operative.”
My purposes require holding a mirror up to Fuller’s argument,
focusing on the benefits from the point of view of the promisee, to whom
the benefits connect and in whom they vest. When parties enter a
contract, they deliberate, not just over the cost of entering the contract—
Fuller’s focus—but also on the benefits of the contract to them. The cost,
psychological wrenches, and other burdens that the individual takes on
are measured against the benefit she expects to get. The individual
considers (or at least, should consider) what it is she is giving up, the role
that the right or item plays in her existence, against the potential benefits
and ramifications of getting the new right or object through the contract
or exchange. Thus, in the case of a large purchase—of a house, for
example—with multiple formalities, these formalities ensure that a buyer
carefully considers whether to give up savings or take on a mortgage as
Fuller envisages; but the buyer measures this against the role a new home
will play in her life. These formalities, and the resulting deliberation—
involving careful consideration of both benefit and cost—give the sensation
of a deprivation when the other party reneges on a contract. The promisee
had contemplated the benefit of the contract, and integrated it into the
narrative of her life. Thus, it is the formalities, and deliberation that arise
from these formalities that help develop a connection between the
would-be owner and the object; they help the object vest. This level of

242. Curtis Bridgeman, Default Rules, Penalty Default Rules, and New Formalism, 33 Fla. St. U.
L. Rev. 683, 687 (2006).
243. Fuller, supra note 240, at 803.
244. Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 Yale L.J.
1, 4 (1941); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 495
(1975) (“The execution of the will is made into a ceremony impressing the participants with its solemnity
and legal significance.”).
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deliberation does not exist, for example, when a non-contractual right,
such as a right against a tortious act, is involved.
b. Legitimizing Function
Second, legal formalities provide the promisee’s claim of ownership
in the contractual right with a sense of legitimacy, which bolsters the sense
of vestedness right. Legal metaphors play a powerful role in helping
individuals feel connected to certain interests. As Pierce notes,
“psychological ownership also is further facilitated by the ‘possession rituals’
. . . . [R]ituals such as displaying, showing off, using, and personalizing
possessions facilitate the movement of the culturally prescribed meaning
245
of objects to the individual’s self-identity.”
The contract is a legal ritual. Formalities help frame the parties’
interest in the transaction. To be sure, when individuals recognize their
actions as carrying legal import, backed by state power, they are more
likely to deliberate to ensure that they wish to incur a burden that can be
coercively enforced. However, the contractual right is understood, not
just as a matter of raw power—framing the transaction they have engaged
in as legal also brings to their interest an aura of legitimacy, a sense of “I
deserve this as a right.” Because this point is best made clear in a specific
context, I shall return to it at the end of the Subpart, where I consider the
role this understanding plays in the same-sex marriage debate.
c.

Bargaining and Dignity Recognition

Finally, formalities ensure that the contract is a bargained-for
exchange, and hence, that it is intimately connected to an exercise of will
by the promisee. This creates a sense of community between the promisor
and promisee. Both philosophical and empirical accounts support this
deep connection between the contractual right and the promisee, and
therefore, suggest that formally created contractual rights vest because of
their intimate connection to personhood.
Under the philosophical account, formalities and related doctrines
help denote vested rights because they are relevant to ensuring that the
contract is a bargained-for exchange. On Daniel Markovits’s account,
contracts as bargained-for exchanges do more than facilitate the efficient
exchange of goods—they create a “respectful community” between
246
promisor and promisee that implicate the personhood of both parties.
When a promisor makes a promise to provide a good, or behave in a
certain manner, she adopts the promisee’s ends as her own. By adopting
the promisee’s ends as her own, the promisor respects the promisee, and
submits to her will, and in so doing, treats her as an end in herself (and

245. Pierce et al., supra note 63, at 96.
246. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1432 (2004).
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vice versa). This mutual submission creates a community based in the
common ends the promisee and promisor share through the contract—
the benefits of the contract demarcate the bounds of the community.
As Markovits explains, the consideration doctrine, or other related
(and required) formalities that indicate that the contract was a bargainedfor exchange, ensures that the promisee played an active role in the
247
exchange. When the promisee is passive, she exercises no will of her
own—the promisor presumes or hypothesizes the promisee’s ends and
acts accordingly. This does not create the mutual community which
Markovits argues underlies contract theory. But when the promisee
actively identifies an end to which the promisor submits, the promisee
engages in developing the community. As Markovits shows, contract
248
doctrines seek primarily to ensure the existence of an active promisee.
The meaning, then, of a bargained-for exchange, is the promisor’s
submission to the ends, and ultimately, to the will, of the promisee, in the
context of providing a specific contractual right. The right vests, under
this account, not just because it is a part of the promisee’s life narrative
or plans, or because the promisee relied on it, but because it represents
the will of the promisee, a recognition of the promisee as an end in
herself. Breaking the promise, and depriving the promisee of the
contractual right, does not just betray the sense of community created,
but also disrespects the promisee.
Lest this approach seem more metaphysical than realistic, it bears
mentioning that as an empirical matter, individuals, even in commercial
situations, value contractual performance far more than the performance
249
is actually worth. More to the point, these experiments suggest that
breach is considered to impose dignitary harms, such as betrayal and loss
250
of trust, upon the promisee.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1487.
249. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1003 (2010).
250. To be sure, experiments that show that loss in contract are seen as more harmful than loss in
tort do not necessarily prove dignitary harm. Id. at 1024. Rather, as suggested above, it may merely
mean that the promisee has fit the promise within her life, and maybe made plans in reliance on the
promise. While this shows vesting, it is not the vesting that creates dignitary harms when the right is
withdrawn.
However, if the right were important only because of the role it would play in the promisee’s
life, then contractual non-performance should be a greater blow in any case: the reason for nonperformance should be irrelevant. However, the experiments show that promisees explicitly take into
account the reason for non-performance. Experiments also show that promisees are more willing to
accept non-performance due to promisor mistake rather than deliberate non-performance, mainly
because the latter disrespects the promisee more than the former. The point is that the formally
bargained-for contractual right is bonded to the promisor; the promisor’s attitude toward that right is
an indicator of the promisor’s attitude toward the promisee herself. The formal right is not just bound
up in the promisee’s life plans, but signifies, in that context, the promisee’s dignitary standing. Rights
produced by formalistic bargaining thus are of key importance in determining vestedness.
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My purpose here is merely to show that vestedness requires
consideration of the connection between the right and its owner.
However, this does not provide all the doctrinal answers: connection is a
matter of degree, and it is not always clear when a right is sufficiently
connected to be vested. The dilemma is clear with respect to each aspect
of the doctrine—how much time or reliance, or what kind of formalities,
are enough to establish the degree of connectedness for vesting to occur?
Further, the nature of the connection may differ from right to right—
some rights are constitutive of identity; others help define aspects of self
that extend beyond one’s identity or social role; and yet others (as we
shall see in the next Subpart) are important for instrumental reasons, not
themselves constitutive of identity, but helping us achieve other goals
that are important to develop our personhood.
The antebellum Court similarly encountered problems regarding the
boundaries of formal contract. The Court treated certain legislative
grants of rights, including corporate charter grants, as contractual, and
therefore, vested, and others as purely legislative subject to legislative
change. The Court thereby created a thicket, where litigants and
legislatures were unsure which laws were “locked in” and which were
subject to change. The Court slowly retreated from treating corporate
charters, for example, as contracts between the state and private entities.
As the antebellum period progressed, the Court drew a firm line with the
Contract Clause, protecting only contracts (or very similar enactments) to
251
prevent such ambiguity. But doctrinal problems still remain. Hopefully,
by providing an underlying rationale for vested rights doctrine, this
analysis will help guide future doctrine.
2.

Vested Rights Applied: The Same-Sex Marriage Cases

Each of the criteria—time, reliance, and formalities—present their
own vexing questions. For example, a question may arise as to what time
period should count toward the vesting: in the case of a pension benefit,
one could conceivably calculate the vesting period in various ways, dating
from the date of hire, the employment start date, or the date of the first
pension contribution, to the date of the last contribution, the date of
departure, or the date of cessation of benefits. However, legislative or
organizational policies often set such vesting rules, which are generally
unambiguous except at the margins. By contrast, while time-vesting rules
are usually specified, whether reasonable reliance vests a right may rely
on a host of factors that are not similarly spelled out, but approached (I
think correctly) in an ad hoc fact-specific fashion. Whether there is reliance
and the reliance is reasonable, therefore, depends on facts on the ground,
about which it is difficult to theorize ex ante, and regarding which there
251. Kainen, supra note 28, at 423.
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252

is ample (if not entirely clear) guidance. At any rate, these questions
usually arise only in specialized areas of law, and are not included in this
more general treatment.
Compared to the doctrine on vesting through time or reliance
interests, the doctrine on vesting through formalities is less clear. Yet, the
question has recently entered the constitutional mainstream in the marriage
litigation context. Determining what formalities vest a right is also a
context-based determination—in Marbury, for example, Chief Justice
Marshall had no trouble determining that the affixing of the seal to
Marbury’s commission vested his right to the commission. But in other
circumstances, tradition and positive law may fall short. Marriage
equality litigation presents a useful contemporary and mainstream
investigation of the undertheorized role formalities play in vesting rights.
At the time of writing, plaintiffs married between the invalidation of
a same-sex marriage ban by the district court refusing to stay its
judgment and the subsequent staying of a judgment by a higher court,
253
filed lawsuits in three states. These states seek to refuse to recognize
these marriages. In all of these cases, the plaintiffs argue that even
though the law no longer permits same-sex marriage, because the higher
court stayed the district court orders invalidating the marriages, their
marriages remain valid.
254
The most legally developed case (albeit now moot) and the only
one in which an opinion has been issued at the time of writing, is the case
arising in Utah, where the district court struck down the marriage bans
255
on December 20, 2013, without staying its ruling. The Supreme Court
256
stayed the ruling on January 6, 2014. During this nearly one-year gap,
some 300 same-sex couples married. In Evans v. Utah, the district court
257
held that the marriages had to be recognized. After providing some

252. These questions generally arise only where zoning ordinances are in question. Courts analyze
the behavior of the agency, the rights holder, the stage of the development of the project, and the nature
and scope of the right sought in determining whether there was reasonable reliance. Zoning: Proof of
Vested Right to Complete Development Project, 35 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 385 provides an excellent
overview of some of these considerations.
253. Bloechl-Karlsen v. Walker—Freedom to Marry in Wisconsin, Am. Civ. Liberties Union,
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/bloechl-karlsen-v-walker (last updated Sept. 17, 2014); Caspar v. Snyder,
No. 14-cv-11499, 2015 WL 224741 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015); Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192
(D. Utah 2014).
254. The Tenth Circuit granted appellant’s motion to dismiss. See Evans v. Utah, No. 14-04060
(10th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss). However, the arguments in the
other cases are, so far, identical to those made in Utah.
255. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
256. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), aff’d, 755 F. 3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert denied,
135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
257. This case is now moot because the Tenth Circuit found in favor of plaintiffs in Kitchen v. Herbert,
775 F.3d 1193. However, in Michigan and Wisconsin, where the Sixth Circuit upheld marriage bans, the
litigation remains active.
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general background, the court began its discussion of the case itself with
a description of the couples. This description focused on the formalities and
rituals that characterized the couples’ marriages. The sentence with
which the court introduced each set of plaintiffs began with the plaintiffs’
names, and concluded with “obtained” (or “got”) “their marriage license
258
and solemnized their marriage.” The court noted other ceremonies and
licenses where appropriate. According to the court, the first set of plaintiffs
had “performed a commitment ceremony in May 2009, even though the
State of Utah did not recognize the union,” and then got their license in
259
2013. The next set of plaintiffs received a marriage license from
260
Washington D.C. in 2010, and then Utah in 2013. That license was used
in a court proceeding seeking a birth certificate for their son, on which
261
both (rather than just one) parent was listed. The third set of plaintiffs
had had a religious ceremony in 2007 and obtained medical power of
262
attorney. The final couple celebrated the Sunday after Thanksgiving as
their wedding anniversary since one of the couple had proposed marriage
263
on that day in 1992.
Recall the three ways in which formalities achieve vesting: (1)
encouraging deliberation resulting in reliance, (2) creating a sense of
legitimate entitlement to the right in question, and (3) recognizing the
mutual dignity of both promisees. The court’s exhaustive listing of the
various formalities the couples had completed, emphasized the first and
third of these functions. First, the facts established the dignitary aspects
of the marriage contract. After describing the rituals and legal forms that
characterize the couples’ relationships, the court continued by detailing
the mutual commitments the couples made to each other. The partner in
one couple sought to share the responsibility of child rearing with his
partner. A partner in the second couple sought to help her partner with
264
her medical issues. The third sought to provide health insurance
265
coverage for his partner. The rituals constituted recognition of each
others’ needs as important, and a promise to respect these needs and
adopt them as shared goals. Disrupting commitments entered into after
such solemn rituals would be perceived as a greater blow to the partner’s
dignity and a greater ethical breach than if the ritual had never taken place.
Implicit in the court’s discussion is also the idea that marriages were
entered to with great deliberation. The second sentence of the court’s
258. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1198.
259. Id. at 1199.
260. Id. at 1198.
261. Utah recognizes joint adoption by unmarried individuals only in limited circumstances. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-117(4) (West 2015).
262. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1199.
263. Id.
264. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1199.
265. Id.
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descriptions of each couple listed the (in the case of each couple,
substantial) lengths of the relationship. The premarriage ceremonies,
followed by the marriage ritual, were the product of long standing
deliberation. This is not quite the same as the decision to enter marriage
producing the deliberation as I describe above. But because of the
court’s description, the marriage ritual became imbued with the weight of
the couple’s relationship. One would be hard pressed to describe these
marriages as unplanned or accomplished with limited forethought. In
getting married, the couples contemplated and deliberately sought specific
benefits: “Plaintiffs began to exercise the rights associated with such
266
valid marriages . . . .” Revoking the vested marriage rights “‘would
disrupt thousands of actions taken in reliance on the [prior court ruling]
by these same-sex couples, their employers, their creditors, and many
others, throwing property rights into disarray, destroying the legal interests
267
and expectations of thousands of couples and their families.’” The various
rights involved therefore amounted to “‘undermining the ability of
268
citizens to plan their lives according to the law.’”
The court’s recounting of the facts, of course, shaped its analysis.
Based on the facts, which, as recounted, illustrated the deliberationinducing and dignity-inducing role of the formalities, it concluded that
the marriages had vested. In its analysis section, the court returned to the
vested rights doctrine. It explained: The “marriages were authorized by
law at the time they occurred. The marriages were solemnized and valid
under the existing law so that nothing remained to be done. No separate
step can or must be taken after solemnization for the rights of a marriage
269
to vest.” The right “‘ar[o]se[] upon a contract’”; thus, “‘the repeal of
the statute does not affect it’” as it “‘stands independent of the statute’”
270
and the right is “sacred.” This solemnization meant that individuals
could rely on the “right to family integrity, the right to the custody and
care of children of that marriage—that the State cannot take away
271
regardless of the procedures the State uses.” Thus, “the State’s
application of the marriage bans to place Plaintiffs’ marriages ‘on hold,’
necessarily ‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
272
law,’” which is invalid.
The court’s reasoning was strongest when it came to describing the
dignitary-inducing and deliberation- (and therefore, reliance) inducing
roles of ritual. But Utah took square aim at whether the ritual could have

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1204 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1206.
Id. (citing and quoting Tufts v. Tufts, 30 P. 309, 310–11 (Utah 1892)).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1206.
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created a sense of legitimate entitlement by arguing that the marriages were
273
never legitimate in the first place. The State argued that while plaintiffs
may have carried out a marriage ceremony, these were not legitimate,
274
legally recognized formalities, because they were not the result of a
275
“final judgment.” They argued that only a final judgment, rather than
an appealable ruling, could serve to change the law in such a way that
carrying out formalities or rituals in prescription with that ruling could vest
a right. Further, the State also argued that even if the nonfinal judgment
changed the law, the marriages, while legal at the time they were carried
out, did not create vested rights. The Supreme Court’s stay of the district
court’s injunction prevented any vesting. Utah’s reasoning on this point
is not pellucid. It appears to argue that because the stay returned parties
276
to the status quo ante, it could not have “left Plaintiffs with a ‘vested
right.’” Rather, the stay retroactively drained all legal force from the
district court’s decision, such that it never had any force of law. Hence,
any rituals conducted pursuant to that decision were retroactively
277
drained of legal force, as if the decision had never existed. “Thus,”
argued the State, “even if the district court were correct . . . that Utah’s
marriage laws became a ‘legal nullity’” after it issued the injunction and
the injunction became the law, “any rights that might otherwise vest once
278
that order becomes final are still subject to legal changes.”
In focusing on the legitimacy of the ritual, the State tried to
downplay the importance of the marriage formality itself. “The issuance
of marriage licenses” is merely a “ministerial act required by the [court]
decision, not some intervening or supervening cause of the Plaintiff’s
279
marital status.” Because the legitimacy of the ritual was questionable,
the ritual itself could not embody the deliberative and reliance functions
I outline above: “Plaintiffs were on notice—and may well have known”

273. The state made three other arguments. The first two do not squarely implicate the existence
of vested rights, and relate to whether the statute should be read to apply retroactively and the policy
implications of giving legal force to district court opinions that had not been stayed. Neither figured
prominently in the court’s analysis, and I do not address them. The third has to do with the scope of the
vested right that I address in Part III.
274. My presentation of this point relies on the approach of H.L.A. Hart. To put it simply, my second
order rule corresponds to Hart’s rule of recognition that determines which precepts should be recognized
as a binding legal rules. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 91 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds.,
2d ed. 1994).
275. I rely on the Supreme Court briefing, which is the best explication of the parties’ argument.
Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 14, Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65
(July 16, 2014) (emphasis in original).
276. Id.
277. Although no party makes this connection, I consider this argument identical to that of
Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004), where the California Supreme
Court held that marriages performed without state sanction lacked legal force.
278. Emergency Application, supra note 275, at 16.
279. Id. at 18.
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that Utah was appealing the invalidation of an existing state ban that
280
enjoyed a “presumption of correctness.”
In response, plaintiffs (and the lower court) argued, I think
persuasively, that the district court’s holding did change the law, and that
rights that vested under the law as it existed at the time, permanently
vested, just as if the vesting had occurred pursuant to a statute. First, a
district court’s injunction, they noted, has the force of law; property
obtained as the result of transactions into which others, especially, as in
this case, third parties who were not parties to the case, enter into on the
281
basis of the injunction, vest. Thus, in bankruptcy proceedings, for
example, transactions that third-party creditors may carry out as the
282
result of a holding cannot be undone. Even the relevant government
officials recognized that the marriages were carried out pursuant to
law—as the Attorney General noted, “‘marriages between persons of the
same sex were recognized in the State of Utah between the dates of
December 20, 2013 until the stay on January 6, 2014. Based on our
analysis of Utah law, the marriages were recognized at the time the
283
ceremony was completed.’” Given that the “fundamental change in
legal status” that a marriage works is at least comparable to the effect of
a “commercial transaction,” the vesting of the marriage right must be
284
recognized. Accordingly, no appellate stay can divest the right. A stay
cannot turn back time. Indeed, to obtain a stay of the district court’s
ruling permitting same-sex marriage, the state would have had to argue
that without a stay, it would suffer irreparable harm. The very premise of
there being “irreparable harm” is that the district court’s ruling would
result in a legally imposed harm that cannot be undone as part of the
285
regular appellate process. Because the law had changed once an
injunction had issued, the formality held a legitimate basis; therefore, a
vested right was created that the appellate process by itself could not
divest. The Supreme Court ultimately declined to grant the relief that
Utah sought.

280. Id. at 10, 15.
281. Respondents’ Opposition to Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at
13, Evans v. Utah, 135 S. Ct. 16 (2014) (No. 14A65).
282. Id.
283. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting letter from Utah Attorney
General Sean Reyes to county attorneys and county clerks).
284. Respondents’ Opposition, supra note 281, at 17.
285. Evans, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1210.
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C. Vestedness Outside the Vestedness Context
1.

Other Contexts Where Rights Connect

The explicit role of the vested rights doctrine in the marriage cases
is a bit of an anomaly. As the distributive approach to ownership, embodied
286
in substantive due process, gained ascendance at the turn of the century,
the vested rights doctrine became cabined to specialized doctrinal areas.
However, the long established role that the connectedness approach
played in our jurisprudence meant that in many contexts, the dominant
distributional approach would adopt as its guide notions of connectedness,
recognizing already possessed rights as more fundamental to individual
existence, without formal or explicit invocation of connectedness-related
doctrines. The clearest example is in the case of welfare benefits, where
the refusal to provide rights comes under less scrutiny than taking away
benefits once given. In his seminal article on the then-new benefits
287
jurisprudence, Charles Reich anticipated this approach. As he observed
regarding government distributed benefits, “the exact nature of the
288
government action” involving the benefit “makes a great difference.”
Government action may take the form of a “denial of the right to apply,
denial of an application . . . suspension or revocation of a grant, or some
289
other sanction.” Although the doctrine had not solidified, Reich claimed
that, “[i]n general, courts tend to afford the greatest measure of protection
290
in revocation or suspension cases,” rather than losses involving denials.
Less than a decade later, the Court converted Reich’s observation
into hard doctrine. After setting in place protections for termination of
291
welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court declined to similarly
292
protect denials of applications for benefits a year later. Faced with an
initial denial of disability benefits in Richardson v. Perales, the Court
distinguished Kelly, noting merely that, “Kelly, however, had to do with
termination of AFDC benefits without prior notice. . . . [(In Perales, we)] are
not concerned with termination of disability benefits once granted. Neither
293
are we concerned with a change of status without notice.” Courts have
relied on Perales (again, to my knowledge, without reasoning) to hold
294
that an initial denial of benefits does not merit due process.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Kainen, supra note 18, at 142 (describing the rise of substantive due process).
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
Id. at 406–07 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2008).
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The best explanation for this approach lies in a throwaway comment
of Reich’s: “The theory seems to be that [in cases of revocation] some
295
sort of rights have ‘vested,’” an explanation, or rather, an analogy,
296
upon which courts and scholars have similarly relied. But the Court did
not invoke the time, reliance, or formality factors of typical vested rights
analysis. Rather, it pointed to the nature of the benefit to explain why the
benefit was deeply intertwined with its recipient’s life. As the Goldberg
297
Court explained, the loss is “grievous” : “[T]he crucial factor in”
Goldberg was “that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
over eligibility [might have] deprive[d] an eligible recipient of the very
298
means by which to live while [s]he wait[ed].” This impinges upon
important personhood interests—not just in life itself, but also in
developing as a human being. “Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in
299
the life of the community.” By contrast, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the
Court sanctioned a lesser degree of protection for disability benefits than
welfare benefits, noting, “[T]he hardship imposed upon the erroneously
terminated disability recipient may be significant. . . . [but the] disabled
300
worker’s need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient.” Thus,
benefits can develop connections with their recipients, not just because
301
of reliance, time, or formality, but also because of their nature.
Relatedly, in some cases, the Court has held that some benefits are
simply too inchoate to count as interests that merit Goldberg type
hearings, even if they are being taken away. In such cases, the Court
looks to state law to see if the interest is clearly defined as a property
302
right. A court may also consider reasonable expectations of the parties
303
with respect to the benefit or right. Both considerations relate to the
degree of connectedness between the benefit and the owner. An interest
that I do not consider a right, nor expect to retain, is not one to which I
would be closely connected.

295. Reich, supra note 287, at 744.
296. Courts have also referred to benefits as vested rights. See, e.g., Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke,
930 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1991).
297. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263.
298. Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added).
299. Id. at 265.
300. 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
301. Recall that moral theorists are likely to pick rights that are considered connected to an individual
because of their nature as human or civil rights that all individuals possess in the distributive sense. But this
does not, as discussed above, diminish their importance on a connectedness account.
302. See, e.g., Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke, 930 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1991) (interest not choate
enough to constitute a vested right).
303. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922); Charles B. Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960).
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The “new property,” includes under its umbrella interests ranging
from jobs, entitlements, occupational licenses, contracts, subsidies, as
well as intangible property that are the product of labor, time, and
creativity, such as intellectual property, business goodwill, and enhanced
304
earning potential from graduate degrees. As Reich observed, the new
property “takes the form of rights or status rather than of tangible goods”
305
(though, as I argue above, so does the “old” property). Scholars have
linked this notion of property to interests such as family relationships
306
and even racial identity. It is therefore unsurprising that the nonretrogression principle has wandered into other areas of doctrine as well.
2.

NFIB v. Sebelius

The Affordable Care Act case, National Federation of Independent
307
Business v. Sebelius, is a good, contemporary example of anti-rightsretrogression principles where the vested rights doctrine is not formally
involved. There, the Supreme Court struck down a major provision of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that required states to
expand Medicaid provision. In this case, private plaintiffs and numerous
states challenged two major provisions of President Obama’s landmark
legislation. The first provision imposed a tax on individuals who did not
purchase health insurance, which a bare majority of the Court upheld.
The second required states to expand Medicaid to a broad swath of
individuals who previously did not receive benefits by raising income
limits or risk losing federal funding. A supermajority of the Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justices Breyer and
Kagan joined, and another opinion written jointly by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito, held that this was unconstitutional coercion
on the part of Congress. This holding was historic—it was the first time
that the Court had found conditions Congress imposed on the receipt of
federal funds coercive. As Mitchell Berman points out, the Medicaid
holding was “the most potentially significant” of the Court’s holdings in
308
that case—and “the one supported by the least clear rationale.” The
most coherent rationale for the invalidation involves contract law-like
principles and vested rights-like analysis. This understanding makes the
majority approach stronger.
What troubled the Justices most was the threat to take away federal
funding, even though they agreed that the federal government was not

304. Joseph W. Singer, Re-reading Property, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 711, 722–23 (1992).
305. Reich, supra note 287, at 738.
306. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); David A. Super, A
New New Property, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1773 (2013).
307. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
308. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion, 91 Tex. L. Rev.
1283, 1285 (2013).

K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete)

1420

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/22/2015 9:49 PM

[Vol. 66:1365

obliged to provide the funding in the first place. The facts and arguments
on which the opinions relied centered on two points introduced by the
309
Chief Justice’s controlling opinion. First, Spending Clause legislation is
“much in the nature of a contract,” and the State must “voluntarily and
310
knowingly accept[] the terms of the ‘contract.’” The second point is
about coercion. Congress may not “directly command[] a State to
regulate or indirectly coerce[] a State to adopt a federal regulatory
311
system as its own.” To further these points, the Chief Justice described
at some length the burdens that Medicaid withdrawal would impose on
states, reasoning, therefore, that the withdrawal would amount to coercion.
He then provided a shorter explanation as to why these burdens were
unforeseen and therefore constitutionally valid.
The relationship between the Chief Justice’s points—“contract” and
“coercion”—is far from clear. If the only point of mentioning contract
law is to point out that agreements between the federal and state
governments must be voluntary, then the appeal to contract law is
nominal. The law forbids coercing anyone, not just one’s contractual
312
partners. And to be sure, the rest of the Chief Justice’s reasoning focused
313
more on the consequences of coercion than on contract law issues. He
explained the burdens withdrawal of funding would impose on states.
The weight of the burden, he claimed, constituted coercion. This coercion,
he explained at some length, “threaten[s] the political accountability key
314
to our federal system.” And while states can sometimes be trusted to
take care of themselves, sometimes they cannot; and in this case, Congress
315
was holding “a gun to the head[s]” of the states. The consequences were
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to
316
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”
The opinion goes on to inquire whether the States could have
317
anticipated the expansion as part of the Medicaid contract. But this
“contract” discussion is secondary to, and much shorter than, the discussion
of coercion. It is made only in response to “the Government claim[] that
the Medicaid expansion is properly viewed merely as a modification of
the existing program because the States agreed that Congress could

309. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB,
101 Geo. L.J. 861, 867–68 (2013) (explaining why the Chief Justice’s opinion is best described as the
controlling one in this context).
310. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (internal citations omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2604–07.
313. Id. at 2604.
314. Id. at 2602.
315. Id. at 2604.
316. Id. at 2605.
317. Id.
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change the terms of Medicaid when they signed on in the first place.”
The Court held that there were limits to this power because the States
319
could not have anticipated this expansion. But it is unclear what the
import of this argument is: based on the Court’s reasoning, states’ ability
320
to anticipate the expansion was beside the point. Coercion, whether
321
anticipated or not, is unconstitutional.
Scholarship has therefore focused on the coercion argument. As
Glenn Cohen explains, there was no coercion because the federal
government was never obliged to create the program in the first place.
“[T]here is no normative or constitutional obligation for the federal
government to create or fund a Medicaid programme ab initio,” and the
322
federal government could have imposed these conditions in a new plan.
Thus, unlike the case of the highway robber who imposes unlawful
323
conditions, the federal government is in the clear. Mitch Berman similarly
argues that the Court’s reasoning is undertheorized and insufficiently
324
Samuel
distinguishes between improper coercion and compulsion.
Bagenstos has similarly explored the constitutional contours of the
325
coercion argument. Cohen’s assertion—that the coercion argument is
both wrong and weak—is persuasive.
By contrast, the contractual argument—which is a far stronger
argument—has received less attention in its own right (rather than as a
corollary of the coercion argument). At the outset, we must confront the
question of whether we can think of this argument analogously to contract
law at all. The Chief Justice is on solid precedential ground in noting that
federal spending programs are conceived of as “much in the nature of a
326
contract.” But Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor challenged this: “By
including in the Act ‘a clause expressly reserving to it “[t]he right to alter,
amend, or repeal any provision” of the Act,’ . . . Congress put States on
327
notice that the Act ‘created no contractual rights.’” This argument,
which is the only argument the dissent offered to undermine the contract328
like nature of the program, is not persuasive. Contracts frequently

318. Id.
319. Id. at 2606.
320. Id. at 2606–07.
321. See also id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that coercion is the ultimate point).
322. Glenn Cohen, Conscientious Objection, Coercion, the Affordable Care Act, and U.S. States,
20 Ethical Persp. 163, 171–72 (2013).
323. Id.; Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the
Healthcare Cases, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
324. Berman, supra note 308, provides a full exploration of the conception of coercion in this context.
325. Bagenstos, supra note 309, at 868–71.
326. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (internal citation omitted).
327. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to
Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986)).
328. Justice Ginsburg also noted that according to precedent, “‘[u]nlike normal contractual
undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing
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contain clauses granting to one party sole discretion to modify contract
329
terms. The mere presence of an analogous term is not sufficient to
330
render the program dissimilar to a contract.
Next, the dissent claimed that even if the program were contractlike, there was no breach. The Medicaid statute “contains a clause
expressly reserving ‘[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision’”
331
to Congress. However, under traditional contract law principles (that
is, apart from any unrelated constitutional limitations), this does not give
Congress carte blanche to alter the program. Under standard contract
law doctrines recognized in most states, such as the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, such provisions encompass only those eventualities
332
that both parties would reasonably contemplate. Under this reading,
then, even though the clause gave sole discretion to Congress, Congress
was expected to act reasonably. This approach, admittedly, creates some
ambiguity, but no more than has existed in contract doctrine in this area
for many years. For example, it is unlikely that courts would countenance
a bait and switch where Congress suddenly shifted the burden of funding
to the states, or attempted to shirk federal commitments after states
altered their infrastructure, and took other actions in reliance on the
promises made in the program (that are not otherwise protected by other
statutes or agreements).
A better ground for the decision, then, would have more clearly
analogized to contract doctrine, specifically the covenant of good faith and
333
fair dealing. The decision to terminate the Medicaid program contract
must be made in good faith; it cannot be used as a bargaining ploy to force

the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy.’” Id. at 2637 n.21 (quoting Bennett v.
Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)). But this is not terribly informative because it only
informs us that there are some differences between Spending Clause legislation and contracts. It does
not suggest that past cases have held that the distinction renders Spending legislation unlike a contract
as a general matter—indeed, the precedent on which the controlling opinion relies on in suggesting
that such legislation is “much in the nature of a contract” appears to foreclose that argument.
329. Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1099, 1101–06 (2010) (providing a recent comprehensive
overview of these kinds of contracts).
330. I recognize that the implication of my argument is that this aspect of the reasoning of Bowen,
477 U.S. 41, on which Justice Ginsburg relies, is incorrect. I believe that Bowen was undermined by
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), (decided the following year) and its progeny, on which the
Chief Justice relies. Ultimately, however, the precedent is ambiguous, and I believe one must analyze
the argument on its own terms.
331. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2574 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012)).
332. Steve J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, Contractual Good Faith: Formation, Performance,
Breach, Enforcement § 2.2.1, at 23–29 (1995).
333. Berman, supra note 308, at 1300, correctly argues that contract doctrine as presented by the Court
does not support the majority’s putative coercion-based reasoning, and looks beyond contract law to explain
the Court’s reasoning. However, my claim here is that other contract doctrines explain the reasoning
independent of the coercion based argument. See generally Alces & Greenfield, supra note 329 (discussing
the use of the doctrine in analogous contract contexts).
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states into taking conditions that Congress could not otherwise force on
them because of their unforeseeable nature. This approach does not require
Congress to “provide clear notice of conditions it might later impose” at
334
the outset of a program, as the dissent contends. Rather, it simply requires
that later conditions imposed as a result of the provision giving the federal
government discretion to change the program could have been reasonably
335
in the contemplation of the parties when the program was first enacted.
The majority did not precisely adopt this approach. However, in
responding to the government, it emphasized that states, as a factual matter,
could not have contemplated the expansion when signing onto Medicaid:
“A State could hardly anticipate that Congress[]” would endeavor to
336
“transform [the Medicaid program] so dramatically.” The explanation is
compelling:
The original program was designed to cover medical services for four
particular categories of the needy . . . . Previous amendments to Medicaid
eligibility merely altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories.
Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program
to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with

334. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Indeed, this foreseeability aspect of contract doctrine
(combined with other doctrines, such as contracts void on grounds of illegality) can be used to explain
Spending Clause jurisprudence more broadly, as laid out in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203. The
elements of the doctrine suggest that one of the goals the Court hopes to achieve through this doctrine
is (among other things) to ensure that when Congress alters the conditions of a program, the
conditions remain within the contemplated scope of the contractual arrangement. Id. at 207–11. This
justification of the factors applies only to situations where Congress may, ex post, alter the conditions
of the contract, and not to situations where the conditions are laid out in advance. In such situations,
the Dole factors cannot serve the predictability interest outlined here, as the conditions are already
known. This Article remains agnostic as to whether they serve other values or no values at all.
Dole requires that a condition be (a) unambiguous, (b) related to the federal interest in the
program, (c) constitutional, and, (probably) (d) not unduly coercive. Id. at 213. But see Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (suggesting that this is not an element
of the Dole test). Each of these serve the policy of ensuring that in complex programs, states are not
blindsided when Congress imposes a new condition on existing programs. After all, states cannot
clearly contemplate complying with a contractual arrangement whose terms are ambiguous, or whose
terms range unpredictably beyond the subject matter of the contract. It is, after all, hard to clearly
contemplate the meaning of a promise that is unclear. Nor could they imagine a condition that is
unrelated to the program at hand: for example, if the Department of Health and Human Services
(with Congressional authorization) adopted provisions commandeering state police forces, under a
pure contract law approach (and independent of federalism concerns) such regulations would be
invalid as the parties could not have contemplated that such conditions would accompany funding
relating to health and human services. Additionally, a state could not contemplate complying with a
condition that is unconstitutional or that is improperly coercive, under contract law principles against
duress (for example, if Congress threatened to overthrow a state government for failure to accede to
conditions) or void on grounds of public policy. I note that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
may be a free-standing bar, apart from the contract law analogy, to such conditions. Berman’s defense
of an anti-coercion principle resembles the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see supra note 308;
my use of the term “coercion” reflects traditional usage in contract law rather than in the Bermanian
sense.
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income below 133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
337
coverage.

The subsequent discussion of the context of the Act’s passage is also
persuasive.
The dissent responded with two principal arguments, neither of
338
which are compelling. First, it relies on the language reserving to the
federal government the right to alter the contract, and the precedent
interpreting that language, which I address above (although the
339
controlling opinion largely ignores this point). Second, it points to “the
340
But as the
enlargement of Medicaid in the years since 1965.”
controlling opinion points out, “the most dramatic alteration . . . does not
341
come close to working the transformation the expansion accomplishes.”
The better argument in the dissent is that states could have
anticipated a change of this kind precisely because of the context in
which Medicaid was enacted. Medicaid was compromise legislation,
342
enacted only after the failure of universal health care. States were
aware of this. They should have also been aware that given shifting political
coalitions, combined with the clause giving the federal government
discretion to change conditions, the program could be universally (speaking
comparatively at least) expanded. I therefore am, ultimately, unsympathetic
to the controlling opinion’s conclusion; but contract law presents a far
stronger argument than the coercion approach on which it seems to
entirely rely. A contract approach, while ultimately incorrect, would not
have been entirely unprecedented. Like courts have done for centuries, it
would have reconstrued the parties’ intentions based on the language of
their contracts and past dealings, looked to the behavior of the parties
with respect to the current transaction and argued that Congress
“recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program,”
343
something the states could not have contemplated.
Foregrounding the contract law argument helps explain why we
should be (as the Justices were) concerned about the burden rights
revocation imposes, which they, incorrectly used to bolster a coercion

337. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
338. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). “In short, given § 1304, this Court’s construction
of § 1304’s language in Bowen, and the enlargement of Medicaid in the years since 1965, a state would
be hard put to complain that it lacked fair notice when, in 2010, Congress altered Medicaid to embrace
a larger portion of the Nation’s poor.” Id. at 2639.
339. Id. at 2630.
340. Id. at 2639.
341. Id. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
342. Gunnar Almgren, Health Care Politics, Policy and Services: A Social Justice Analysis
81, 85 (2d. ed. 2012).
343. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
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argument. So far, my argument expounds contract law(-like) doctrines
latent in the various opinions, and does not turn on the question of rights
revocation. What is important is that there was (something like) a contract
between two parties and there was a breach, or at least, a violation of a
covenant analogous to that of good faith and fair dealing (which happened
to involve revocation of funds).
344
But we must not forget (as Justice Ginsburg noted in passing) that
this was no usual contract, as the breaching party was the government.
Historically, when there is a contract, and the breaching party is a state,
the wrong was understood not just as a breach of a contract, but also a
345
violation of a vested right. The modern vested rights doctrine is not
capacious enough anymore to easily lend itself to this analysis as a formal
matter. However, the reasoning of much of the controlling opinion’s and
joint dissent’s “coercion” analyses is more coherently understood as
analogous to a vested rights analysis in that it relies on the fact that the
rights involved are deeply connected to the operation of state government.
Part of the reason is the fact that these rights are contractual or pseudocontractual. Such rights are important for the reasons outlined in Subpart
B. But the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters spilled a large amount of
ink attempting to persuade readers of the importance of the Medicaid
program to the states in other ways. The Medicaid program is constitutive
of states—the program “accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s
total budget” and “the States have developed intricate statutory and
administrative regimes over the course of many decades to implement
346
their objectives.” Much as with the case with Goldberg, taking away
resources this important would be untenable. As the joint dissent worried:
A State forced out of the program . . . would almost certainly find it
necessary to increase its own health-care expenditures substantially,
requiring either a drastic reduction in funding for other programs or a
large increase in state taxes. And these new taxes would come on top
of the federal taxes already paid by the State’s citizens to fund the
347
Medicaid program in other States.

Thus, the conclusion is even more dramatic than that in Goldberg. There,
348
349
the threatened loss was “grievous.” Here, it is “a gun to the head.”
James Blumstein provocatively argues that the situation of the states is

344. See supra notes 328 and 330 (discussing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2637 n.21
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part), and Bowen).
345. This is clearest perhaps in the context of corporate charters. A violation of the charter the State
granted was seen as the State trying to get out of a contract it made with a corporation to recognize it and
permit it to do business or hold a monopoly. This was treated as a vested rights violation. See Thompson,
supra note 23.
346. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
347. Id. at 2657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
348. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
349. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J).
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“analogous to the life-choice reliance regarding abortion.” Much like
women who relied on the availability of abortion to order their “thinking
and living,” so too did states rely on the availability of federal funding to
351
order their business.
The contractual breach is, therefore, all the more troubling because
it involves the separation of an entity from a constitutive set of benefits
to which it is deeply connected. Foregrounding the contract argument
then also helps explain the facts that so troubled the Justices, which they
included in their “coercion” analysis, and connects the contract law and
“coercion” arguments in a way that the various opinions fail to do. But
one question remains—can we coherently talk about nonhuman “entities”
352
as subject to a connectedness analysis?
On balance, I think the answer is yes, albeit not with the same degree
of urgency and immediacy as a natural person. First, as a legal matter,
353
corporations have long been recognized as having vested rights. Second,
revoking an entity’s vested rights could harm individuals associated with
the entity, if not the entity itself. Our understanding of an artificial entity,
our allegiance to it, our relationship to it, often depend on certain rights it
possesses. The revocation of certain rights that have ordered our
interactions with the entity and the entity’s interactions with the world
can affect real people affiliated with the entity—employees, customers,
and, in the case of states, citizens. Thus, one could imagine that citizens
of a state that suddenly stopped providing health benefits because of a
loss of federal funding would be affected in ways apart from the damages
caused by the loss of medical assistance. They could well reimagine their
relationship with the State, perceive themselves as betrayed; the State
itself could lose legitimacy in their eyes. While the entity itself, therefore,
can feel no psychological blow, those who understand themselves in relation
to the entity can be negatively affected when the entity ceases to be able
354
to function in a way they feel is essential to the entity.
Third, and finally, certain kinds of negotiation take place between
small groups of individuals, in the intergovernmental context, often part
of small subdivisions or working groups in agencies that have close and

350. James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion:
The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 2011–2012 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 67, 103 n.153.
351. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
352. See Cohen, supra note 322, at 181–82 (expressing doubt that a state can be personified and
coerced); Markovits, supra note 246, at 1465 (doubting whether “it remains possible that contracts
involving organizations might generate a morally valuable collaborative relation”).
353. See e.g. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 576 (1819); Thompson,
supra note 23.
354. While I agree with Markovits that the contract does not bind agents and stakeholders on the same
moral basis as if they were promisees or promisors themselves, the point I am making here is a
psychological rather than moral one. This, to some extent, may deviate from Markovits’s view. See
Markovits, supra note 246.
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recurring professional relationships. These individuals can feel deeply
connected to rights and benefits for which they have negotiated, and can
355
take a breach personally as a betrayal and dignitary harm. This last
category does not apply to negotiation with respect to the Affordable Care
Act, among which many entities were involved at arms-length negotiation.
The connectedness/vestedness argument does not completely turn
on the contract law argument. Certainly, if there were a breach, vested
rights would have been, under black letter law, revoked. But even
without contractual or pseudo-contractual violations, the States could
have developed other, property-like interests in holding on to the funding,
much like the recipients in Goldberg. However, because ultimately there
was no contractual breach and the entities involved were artificial rather
than natural persons, the States’ case became weaker. The decisive
factor, however, distinguishing this case from Goldberg, is the fact that
the States sought to limit their constituents’ access to more of the same
right. If state officials truly valued the State’s role as a benefits provider,
and valued the recognition of its citizens as such, they would have
welcomed Medicaid expansion. Rejection of Medicaid expansion belies
the claim that Medicaid funding is central to the State’s identity for these
officials. I therefore conclude, tentatively, that there was no violation
under the connectedness principle. But this vestedness approach makes
the majority’s argument stronger and more coherently links coercion to
the contractual concerns that underlay its argument.

III. Rhetoric and Rights, Revocation, and Restoration
One criticism of the inflation effect judges apply to rights
revocation—at least in the due process context—is that it exerts a
powerful status quo bias on behalf of those who have certain rights, and
disfavors minorities who lack these rights. But such ossification has been
avoided largely through the dialectic flexibility and ambiguity in the
notions of “rights,” or of restoration versus revocation, ambiguities that I
have so far avoided in order to focus on the power the idea of rights
revocation possesses. But rights claims themselves, and the notion of
rights deprivation, are constructed. To understand a right as having been
revoked, we take for granted extraneous understandings of the baselines,
of what the interest it is that the State provided in the first place.
Depending on whether we understand this interest as a right or not, we
will consider the failure to respect an interest a revocation, or perhaps, as
a restoration of a previously existing status quo. Because of the rhetorical
power of rights revocation, opposite sides present their interests as rights,
and a failure to respect those interests as revocation. When institutions
partake in these struggles, their own legitimacy is put on the line. Thus,
355. Id. at 1465 (discussing small organizations).
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the battles over revocation and restoration are more than questions of
fact; rather they are questions over framing, legitimacy, and the role of
the State. In so doing, courts (and other actors) construct the “victims” of
the revocation, the entities claiming rights and their revocation, as well as
the “perpetrators,” the entities that allegedly revoke the rights.
Understanding how these claims play out is important in order to
work out the role rights revocation analysis plays—the analysis is not
some product of the burden imposed by a clear revocation of right.
Rather, it helps construct the right itself, and whether the failure to
respect the interest was a revocation. Subpart A explains the long deferred
question of how we can even properly conceive of rights violations as
rights revocations, and relies on a distinction of rights as constructed
versus rights as capabilities. Subpart B expands on this understanding
that rights are constructed: various constituencies claim that certain
interests are rights. Hence both sides in a case may claim that there is a
right involved. Plaintiffs claim that the challenged action has taken away
the right. Defendants claim that the challenged action did no more than
restore a right which was previously taken away. Subpart C concludes by
explaining how the legitimacy of government institutions themselves is
implicated in this process.
A. Conceptualizing Rights Revocation
Sometimes the State literally takes away a right, as I shall explain, in
the case of Proposition 8. But sometimes, one may argue, what the State
does is “violate” rather than literally take away a right. Throughout this
Article, I, like many others, have casually referred to this behavior as
rights revocation. As I explain, the different ways in which we conceptualize
rights helps make sense of thinking of rights violations also as revocations.
Let us first consider the easiest case of rights revocation. Most
lawyers would take a formal approach to defining rights: when a litigant
goes into court and claims a right against the State, as a formal matter
she is describing a certain legal relationship between herself and the
State. The State has failed to respect that legal relationship, and the
plaintiff seeks judicial remedy.
The State may alter the legal relationship between the plaintiff and
itself, if it has the power to do so, to obliterate the plaintiff’s claim. In
such a situation, the taking away metaphor makes sense—the plaintiff no
longer possesses the ability she once did to lay a claim against the State.
One example is the case of Proposition 8. According to the California
Supreme Court, at least, the state constitution as originally enacted by
the citizens of the state, required that the State permit same-sex couples
356
access to marriage at the same level as different-sex couples. Opponents,
356. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63 (Cal. 2009).
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of course, suggested that the court created the right, as I shall discuss
more later. The State altered this relationship—the constitution was
amended, and the right to marry was taken away from same-sex couples.
These couples could no longer make this claim of the State (under
California law, at least). These dynamics need not always occur at the
constitutional level or involve citizens versus the State. If the legislature
grants a benefit to an entity—for example, tort immunity in certain
circumstances—and then takes it away, the legislature has altered the
relationship and taken away a benefit that the entity previously enjoyed.
In both examples, the “right” has been stripped by the same power that
granted it.
Consider a situation, however, in which rights are not taken away by
the same entity that grants them. There are no difficulties when the
agency that takes away the right is superior in power to the agency that
grants them—for example, Congress taking away a right granted by an
agency, or the Constitution taking away a right granted by congressional
or state statute. But when the agency that refuses to recognize a right is
of lesser power, a problem arises with respect to the taking away
metaphor when an abstract right is involved.
To speak of a state literally taking away rights granted by the
Constitution appears to be an absurdity. If rights are abstract legal
relationships between entities, permitting individuals to make certain
claims once the Constitution defines what these relationships are, the
State cannot alter them. The State may ignore this de jure relationship
and may fail to respect it, thereby violating its terms. However it cannot
alter this legal relationship, much less obliterate it. We therefore talk
about the State as violating the right. Some may understand a right of a
citizen against the State as a term of the social contract between the
citizen and the State. But by breaching a term of the contract, a
contracting party does not “take away” the contractual term—she simply
violates it.
If the “taking away” of rights by inferior powers were simply
infrequent metaphors in obscure law review articles, it would be an issue
of no concern; legal scholars sometimes make indifferent poets. But we
often talk about violations of rights as revocations of rights. The
Constitution itself imagines rights revocation in this way. For example,
the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deprive”
357
citizens of liberties “without due process of law.” The provision
imagines that states may deprive—that is, take away—constitutionally
guaranteed rights with due process. Even more puzzlingly, courts and
individuals regularly imagine a world in which rights can be taken away,
yet through some sleight of hand, retained. Thus in Bray v. Alexandria

357. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Women’s Health Clinic, Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that women
have been “deprive[d] . . . of their constitutional right to choose an abortion
. . . by [those] blockading clinics with the intended effect of preventing
358
women from exercising a right . . . they possess.” This observation
makes intuitive sense, but when further investigated, it seems problematic:
how could women “possess” and be “deprive[d]” of a right at the same
time? Yet litigants regularly state in one breath that they have rights, but
at the same time, that the right was taken away. Unlike the proverbial
cake, the State may devour your rights but leave them in your possession.
359
To answer this riddle, consider two alternate conceptions of rights.
One is the prescriptive understanding of rights-as-legal-claims. It describes
what plaintiffs believe to be the ideal relationship and set of obligations
and dues between themselves and the state (or the defendant). Another
conception of rights, however, is a descriptive understanding of rights as
capabilities. Rather than ideals, this understanding concerns pragmatic
facts on the ground. To the extent a person can perform the activity
without hindrance, she has a right to engage in the activity; to the extent
she cannot, she lacks the right. Under this conception, we do not engage
with moral or ethical questions as to the ideal relationship between the
person and someone else.
To explain the distinction, consider a simple example: To say that a
woman has the right to have an abortion has different meanings under
the prescriptive and descriptive frameworks. Under the prescriptive
framework, we are describing the proper ideal or moral behavior under
the law of the state (and perhaps others) with respect to a woman. But
under a descriptive account, a woman only has a right to an abortion if
she has the money to go to a clinic where there are doctors who may
perform the abortion. On this account, it does not matter whether she is
owed non-interference or assistance as a moral matter or not—it only
360
matters that she can, in fact, obtain the abortion should she wish to.
Gaining a prescriptive right often entails making arguments to
various groups, including courts, to recognize the right. The state can
only deprive the individual of the right as a prescriptive matter by
altering the state constitution or other moral or legal norms. Obtaining
the right as a descriptive matter involves ensuring access to various other

358. 506 U.S. 263, 343 (1993) (emphasis added).
359. I base my exposition on the work of Martha Nussbaum. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum,
Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 293 (1997).
360. To the extent that our actual behavior is guided by our ideals, it may be important for us to
secure prescriptive access to the right in order to secure the right as a descriptive matter: it may be
harder to have access to something in actual fact (descriptive right), if no one recognizes our moral
entitlement to it (prescriptive right). As Nussbaum puts it, a prescriptive “right . . . would be prior to a
capability [that is, a descriptive right], and a ground for the securing of a capability.” Id.
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resources. The state (or someone else) can deprive the individual of the
right as a descriptive matter by taking away any necessary resource.
When a person goes to court then, and says that she possesses a
right that the state has taken away, she is using the term right in two
different senses. She is saying that as a legal or moral matter, she has a
right—a prescriptive right. However, as a descriptive matter, she is
claiming the state took away her ability to engage in the activity—a
descriptive right—either through ultra vires action or having in place
statutes or policies that limited her actual access to the right in some way.
To be sure, the line between state action and inaction, revocation, and
361
This explains Justice
restoration remains elusive and constructed.
Stevens’s dissent—women “possess” the prescriptive right to have an
abortion without interference (in that case, by a private party under a
statute), but their actual capability of doing so is compromised.
There also remains the question of what level of interference—what
362
burden—constitutes “taking away” a right. For example, one may
claim that only forcible prevention from engaging in the right (by refusal
to provide resources, or ex ante detention) constitutes a deprivation.
Alternatively, ex post sanctions for engaging in the right may also
constitute deprivation. These ex post sanctions may range from drastic
criminal penalties to unofficial harassment. Regulatory takings, in
particular, raise similar questions as to how “heavy” a burden must be to
363
constitute a deprivation on a regular basis. One may differ on whether
there is a line between taking rights away and merely burdening the
right, and if there is one, where that line should be drawn. I set this
question aside as the exact point on which a burden becomes a
deprivation of a right is one that must be analyzed in specific contexts.
B. Constructing Rights and Revocation
Understanding rights as prescriptive, however, means that groups on
both sides of a case can (and do) claim that a failure to respect their
interests would “take away” their “rights.” Understanding how these claims
play out is important in order to work out the role rights revocation analysis
plays—the analysis is not some product of the burden imposed by a clear

361. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol. Sci.
Q. 470 (1923); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 85.
362. This is related to what is a “necessary” condition for an individual to exercise a right. See, e.g.,
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 554 (2003), which found there was a right to same-sex intimate conduct,
from a case involving adoption by gay individuals by explaining that “[t]he relevant state action is not
criminal prohibition [as involved in Lawrence], but grant of a statutory privilege [that is, adoption]”).
363. Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 Stan. L.
Rev. Online 99 (2012) presents a recent statement.
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revocation of right. Rather, it helps construct the right itself, and determines
whether the failure to respect the interest was a revocation.
1.

Constructing Rights

Not all interests can be understood as legal rights. To turn back to
Fuller’s (or indeed, Bracton’s) discussion as an example, individuals
understand only those agreements that are accompanied with formalities
364
as embodying legal rights. Formalities serve the purpose of giving an
individual the understanding that the consequences of her action hold
legal significance. The party to the contract understands, not just that a
right can be asserted against her (which results, as Fuller notes, in
deliberation), but also that she holds a right over another that possesses
legal legitimacy. By contrast, as Bracton and Fuller would tell us, a
promise made without formalities that cannot be enforced would not be
a right. I claim that an individual feels more invested, or connected, to a
right, once it has become understood as a legal right, and it has vested.
But contractual rights are just one set of interests that are
understood as rights in our legal system. Other forces also shape claims
as legal rights claims—and just as individuals feel a greater sense of
connectedness to contractual rights in part because of their legal
significance, understood through formalistic rights frames, individuals in
other contexts feel a greater sense of connectedness to claims they
understand as constituting legal rights.
My previous work documenting how the gay rights movement began
to frame its interests in relationship recognition as a legal right to
marriage in the 1970s provides a particular example of the difference
365
between a mere interest and a right. The fight to end discrimination
based on sexual orientation travelled some distance before its leaders
understood their arguments through legal lenses, and their claims as
“rights.” Leaders of the movement in the 1950s and 1960s utilized medical
frames seeking to persuade society (including other gay individuals) that
sexual orientation was a benign variation that did not deserve persecution.
In the 1970s, however, gays developed a “legal, rights-seeking frame[],”
by analogizing their claims to those of the civil rights movement, and
366
positioning themselves as another minority group.
Relationship recognition, in particular, travelled the distance from
becoming an interest of the movement, to that of a legal right, to finally,
a vested right in some contexts. After initially, apparently, rejecting the
notion of marriage recognition in the early 1950s, the nascent homophile

364. See supra notes 242–44.
365. See Craig Konnoth, Note, Created in its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay
Litigation in the 1950s–1970s, 119 Yale L.J. 316 (2009).
366. Id. at 328.
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movement of the early 1960s began to articulate an interest in relationship
recognition, to make easier the logistics of insurance, taxes, and child
rearing. However, “demands remained limited and untranslatable into
367
the language of a civil rights movement.” Gay activists knew they wanted
relationship recognition, but did not consider it to be a civil right.
Mobilization was discussed, but never really found purchase. It was only
in the 1970s that historical developments allowed gay activists to think of
the possibility that relationship recognition was a civil right of which they
were being deprived. This ensured that cases were filed, and articles
written. The indignation of rights deprivation resulted in marriage being
claimed as a right and provoked related litigation.
Robert Post and Reva Siegel show the dialogic nature of rights
discourse in general, as groups engage with outsiders to persuade them of
that which group members already believe—that the interest they possess
368
holds the power of being a “right.” Thus, when referring to a certain
369
claim as a “right,” litigants perform a performative, jurisgenerative,
political act, claiming an interest as an artifact of the constitutional
370
universe. They are conscious that this claim will be judged by courts
and by the public, opponents will respond to it. Accordingly, they will
engage in campaigns to frame the right as a right both within their own
community and outside the community. Their claim that a certain option
is a right is subject to numerous constraints. That rhetoric of rights
establishes a felt connection between litigants or activists and the claim
along with the concomitant sense of connection and loss when one feels
that a right has been taken away.
Because interests are converted into rights through narrative,
distributive notions of ownership birth the sense of connectedness to the
right. It is those rights we describe as basic capabilities, primary goods or
fundamental rights of Part I.C that we feel the deepest connections to—
but to categorize those rights as such we need a theory of distribution, be it
based on specific kinds of morality, as I explain above, utilitarianism, or
something else. But here is where our understandings of ownership
merge—we feel connected to an object because we believe we should
possess it based on a distributive system of justice, which may in turn
allot us the object because of the connection we feel to it.

367. Id. at 359.
368. See generally, Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373 (2007).
369. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
370. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 868 (2002).
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Competing Rights

As a conceptual matter, understanding what the right is requires an
371
understanding of, as Sunstein puts it, the “constitutional baseline.” Is
the correct baseline from which we measure state action a regime where
no welfare benefits are provided, such that anything that goes over that
baseline is something more, a non-right, which can be taken away without
impunity? Or is the baseline the provision of benefits, such that the
failure to provide the benefit is the revocation of a right? Extraneous
normative arguments shape these claims.
Accordingly, and unsurprisingly, claims are often articulated as
competing rights. In many cases, both sides may claim that they have
“rights,” of which they are being deprived. The quintessential example is
that of opposing private parties (tabling the question of whether states
can claim that their interests may also count as rights). Here, I am not
only talking about competing contractual claims, but also constitutional
cases. For example, as Herbert Wechsler famously observed many years
372
ago, Brown v. Board of Education limited the rights of white parents to
ensure that their children did not associate with black children—which
may have been inimical to important identity interests these parents
373
held. Reva Siegel describes the powerful role this argument played in
the reaction in southern courts, legislatures, and other institutions that
374
sought to limit the reach of Brown. The State may even extend these
prohibitions to other contexts, such as employment (though, of course,
375
prohibiting private discrimination is not constitutionally required).
In these cases, although a state qua state has no cognizable
376
interest, surely the individuals that are forced to participate in the
state-sponsored activity may claim a vested right, or experience an
endowment effect in the right of (non-)association (or of discrimination)
they are forced to give up which may be important to their personhood.
If courts considered a vested interest or the endowment effect in, for
example, associational interests in their analysis under the Due Process
Clause, the interests of discriminators could win the day. The rights
reversal analysis would significantly harm the rights of minorities.

371. It does so precisely because it embodies a controversial substantive baseline. Cass R. Sunstein,
Neutrality in Constitutional Law (Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 43 (1992); see Sunstein, supra note 13, at 45.
372. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
373. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959).
374. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1487–89 (2004).
375. But is currently prohibited by statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2015).
376. This resembles the point I make in Part II.C.2 that stakeholders in corporate entities are
affected when the entity loses certain abilities, in this case, the ability of the State to discriminate.
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At the doctrinal level, however, courts will not recognize a “vested
377
right to do wrong” —such as an interest in discrimination. Thus, in a
case like Brown, a Court would answer that the interest of discriminators
378
cannot be considered when bare animus animates the interest. The
Court first determines whether there is a legitimate, non-animus based
interest present before it considers whether the right is taken away.
But the extra-constitutional forces that “construct” rights, to which
Post, Siegel, and I, among others have pointed, ultimately influences this.
379
A bare animus interest can shade into an interest in association, as
Wechsler pointed out, (or indeed, as we can imagine, into freedom of
380
381
religion, speech, and so on). The Court must make (and has made)
value judgments as to where this line lies based upon claims, analogies,
and frames employed by litigants. Thus, when an individual claims the
right of nonassociation with blacks, a court would have to first determine
whether the First Amendment’s right of association covers the interest.
382
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which the Boy Scouts violated a
state antidiscrimination law by expelling a gay scoutmaster, and other
383
cases, the Court has concluded that the right of freedom of association
protects certain discriminatory acts that exclude LGB individuals. Thus,
the rights-revoking analysis would require a court to consider the
endowment effect the Boy Scouts felt when losing the right to exclude
LGBT individuals under state antidiscrimination law. In Brown, the
rights at stake were not legitimate interests in association. Thus, the
Court could not consider the discriminatory interests of certain white
parents, nor the endowment effect attaching to those interests. The
different framings of the rights at stake in Brown and Dale yielded different
outcomes.
3.

Constructing Revocation

Our definition of what a right is, ultimately, affects whether we
conceptualize a government action as revoking or restoring rights.
Because rights revocation rhetoric has visceral, and often doctrinal,
power, cases often see a battle over whether the state action took a right
away, or merely restored a preexisting right that was unfairly taken away.
Let us return again to Proposition 8. Did the opponents take away a right
377. See, e.g., Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160, 175 (1864) (internal citation omitted).
378. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
379. Wechsler, supra note 373.
380. Cf. Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a prohibition on
wearing an anti-abortion button featuring a fetus in employment does not constitute religious discrimination
violating Title VII).
381. Cf. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that laws against hate speech violate the
First Amendment).
382. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
383. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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or restore the status quo? As I note above, the California Supreme Court
suggested that the right to marry always existed in the California
Constitution. Proponents of Proposition 8 disagreed; for them, marriage
had traditionally been between members of different sexes. Thus, in
reviewing the effects of Proposition 8, in a notable passage, the Ninth
Circuit stated that “[p]roponents resist . . . framing . . . the question” as
384
taking rights away. “In re Marriage Cases was a ‘short-lived decision,’
and same-sex couples were allowed to marry only during a ‘143-day
hiatus’ between the effective date of the Marriage Cases decision and the
385
enactment of Proposition 8.” Thus, proponents argued, Proposition 8
took no rights away, rather it was “a decision to ‘restore’ the ‘traditional
definition of marriage’” that the California Supreme Court had taken
386
away. Similarly, in their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court, proponents
argued that Proposition 8 took nothing away; it merely gave back what
387
was already there.
Proposition 8 was challenged on various federal constitutional
grounds. The Ninth Circuit held specifically that revoking already existing
marriage rights violated equal protection guarantees. Allowing proponents
to successfully argue that the interests that same-sex couples had before
Proposition 8 could not be called “rights” would have been fatal to the
Ninth Circuit’s decision. The court would not have been able to hold that
Proposition 8 revoked rights, which, in turn, would have depleted the
force of its argument. The court therefore made short shrift of this
argument. The court claimed to be
bound . . . by the California Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation
of Proposition 8’s effect on California law . . . Proposition 8
“eliminat[ed] . . . the right of same-sex couples to equal access to the
designation of marriage” by “carv[ing] out a narrow and limited
exception to these state constitutional rights” that had previously
guaranteed the designation of “marriage” to all couples, opposite-sex
388
and same-sex alike.

This was therefore a case of rights revocation.
Contrast Perry with the important state action case, American
389
There, workers
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.
complained that the State had facilitated insurance companies’ ability to
withhold payment for medical benefits by repealing an earlier law that

384. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated on jurisdictional grounds by
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
385. Id. (internal citations omitted).
386. Id.
387. Brief for Petitioner at 27–36, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No.12-144).
388. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1079 (alteration in original) (quoting Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61, 76
(Cal. 2009)).
389. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
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390

prohibited such withholding.
This, the workers claimed, was
391
unconstitutional. The Court rejected the claim, holding that rather than
392
taking away the right of workers not to have payments withheld, the
repeal of the law simply restored the preexisting rights of insurance
companies to withhold payments that earlier amendments took away.
“The 1993 amendments, in effect, restored to insurers the narrow option,
historically exercised by employers and insurers before the adoption of
Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation law, to defer payment of a bill
393
until it is substantiated.”
The contrast between Perry and Sullivan is clear. Where the State
takes away a right—as in Sullivan—it imposes a burden on those (there, the
insurance companies) whose rights were withdrawn. It may therefore
restore their rights. Indeed, in Sullivan, the Court held that not only was
the State entitled to restore the rights, but also that such restoration did
not even count as state action because it simply recreated a status quo
that had been impermissibly altered. Thus, by successfully claiming the
mantle of rights restoration, insurance companies erased the very agency
of the State. In Perry, proponents claimed—and were denied—the same
mantle of rights restoration. Being denied the mantle of rights restoration
had important consequences: the change they effectuated was characterized
as revocation rather than restoration, and therefore, treated as illegitimate.
Multiple criteria can affect the framing as to whether revocation rather
394
than restoration of rights, or some other innocuous change, has occurred.
Clearly, the revocation-restoration frame and the rights-non-rights
frames cannot be considered independent of each other. Determining
when a particular behavior is a right or an entitlement often determines
whether a court can frame its loss as a revocation or a restoration. To
return to Sullivan, part of the Court’s move was to characterize the right
involved not as the workers’ right not to have insurance payments
395
withheld. Rather, the right was that of the insurance companies to
396
withhold payments. Depending on who could lay claim to the language
of rights, the revocation versus restoration analysis would have come out
differently. Thus, the rhetoric of revocation-versus-restoration is, at the

390. Id. at 47–48.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 53–54. (“Before the 1993 amendments, Pennsylvania restricted the ability of an insurer
(after liability had been established, of course) to defer workers’ compensation medical benefits, including
payment for unreasonable and unnecessary treatment, beyond 30 days of receipt of the bill.”).
393. Id.
394. This is where I depart most sharply from Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note 13. Sunstein
decries the status quo bias that institutions exhibit. I agree that in many cases, such a bias can create
problems. However, Sunstein ignores the fact that our very notion of the status quo is constructed in
many circumstances.
395. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 53.
396. Id.
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same time, an important battleground that frames and is framed by rights
discourse itself.
To return to Evans v. Utah, briefly, the State attempts a similar
move that illustrates how the scope of the right affects whether the state
action constitutes impermissible revocation. In its reply brief, the State’s
second argument was that it did not seek to “revoke[]” “marriage
397
licenses.” Rather, it would no longer recognize marriages of same-sex
couples that married in Utah going forward. Thus, it was not taking away
a right; rather, because it combined the scope of the right, its action was
about prospective application. Of course, this premise can only be
accepted if one sees the marriage right as an empty formality, rather than
consisting of the bundle of rights and obligations that become vested
with the ritual. At best, Utah’s move here looks a lot like a regulatory
taking: individuals can hold on to the property, but all value has been
divested from the property. Unsurprisingly, this argument did not prove
successful—having conceded that the lower court injunction created a
marriage right, Utah was limited in its ability to cabin the scope of the
right.
C. Institutional Conflict and Legitimacy Claims—Describing the
Perpetrators
So far, this Article has concentrated on the rhetoric of revocation in
cases used by courts and activists to explain themselves. The rhetoric is
used to help explain why the winners in the cases won and why the losers
lost. However, the players in the game are not only the litigants. Courts
and their legitimacy are very much in the mix. Through their decisions,
courts paint themselves as the restorer of rights taken away by other
governmental actors. In this way, they attempt to ensure their stature and
legitimacy in the constitutional world. But other constitutional actors,
including legislatures and executives, also attempt to make similar
claims. This becomes apparent in the tussle between the Proposition 8
proponents and the California Supreme Court on the issue of revocation
and restoration.
In Perry, the Ninth Circuit claimed, based on the California
Supreme Court’s characterization in Strauss v. Horton, that the California
Constitution always mandated marriage equality, which Proposition 8
398
But Strauss’s characterization of
“eliminated” and “repealed.”
Proposition 8 as revoking a right, rather than merely reinstating the
status quo, is puzzling at first. Strauss was concerned with whether
Proposition 8 was so broad that it constituted an impermissible revision

397. Reply in Support of Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 4,
Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65 (July 18, 2014).
398. Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61 (Cal. 2009).
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to the California Constitution rather than just an amendment. It held
that Proposition 8 was a sufficiently minor change to the California
Constitution that it constituted an amendment rather than a revision of
400
the constitution. Had Strauss held that the change merely reinstated a
previously existing definition—just as the Supreme Court did in Sullivan
by claiming that the legislature only reinstated a previously existing
right—it may have bolstered its argument that the Proposition was nothing
but an amendment by minimizing the extent of the change.
It is not as if the court lacked material to rely upon. Indeed, the
401
Proposition 8 ballot material (on which the court partially relied)
would have allowed the court to do so. The first and longest capitalized
phrase in the Proposition 8 ballot guide stated that Proposition 8 would
“RESTORE THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE as a man and a
402
woman.” Next, in listing the purpose of the measure, the first purpose
was that it “restores the definition of marriage to what the vast majority of
California voters already approved and human history has understood
403
marriage to be.”
The court’s failure to rely on this language is best explained by the
attack on the court in the ballot measure itself. In explaining why
restoration was necessary, the ballot statement stated that “four activist
judges in San Francisco wrongly overturned the people’s vote[.] [W]e
need to pass this measure as a constitutional amendment to RESTORE
404
THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE . . .” In other words, the ballot
initiative attempted to paint the court as the actor that took away the
right of parents to determine what their children are “taught in public
405
schools.” This point is belabored. The measure would “overturn[] the
outrageous decision of four activist Supreme Court judges who ignored
406
the will of the people.” Similarly, the plaintiff-petitioners noted in their
brief to the Supreme Court that this right existed for a mere “142 days of
407
California’s 162-year history.” Thus, in claiming that it was restoring
rights, the ballot attacked the legitimacy of the court.
Even as it upheld the validity of Proposition 8, the court sought to
reclaim its own legitimacy. It held that its prior decision did not take
away a preexisting right to define marriage as between two heterosexual

399. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 386–87.
400. Id. at 445.
401. Id. at 472.
402. Proposition 8: Argument in Favor and Rebuttal, California Ballot Pamphlet: General
Election Nov. 2, 2008, at 56–57, available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/argurebut/argu-rebutt8.htm.
403. Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 387, at 25 (emphasis in original).

K - Konnoth_18 (ONLINE) (Do Not Delete)

1440

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/22/2015 9:49 PM

[Vol. 66:1365

individuals. Rather, it declared the state of the law at the time.
Accordingly, it was Proposition 8 that took something away—the
initiative measure did not “declare the state of the law as it existed”
under the California Constitution at the time of the Marriage Cases, “but
408
instead established a new substantive state constitutional rule.” Thus,
the court’s response was to preserve its own legitimacy, claiming that all
it did was what a court should do, as set out in the famous maxim of
409
Marbury v. Madison—“declar[ing] what the law is.” In turn, the Ninth
Circuit seized on this self-legitimizing rhetoric to paint proponents as
right revokers, and therefore as illegitimate. This rhetoric defines the
relationship, not just on a micro-scale between the California Supreme
Court and the proponents of Proposition 8, but also on a macro-scale
between courts and other government actors in general. Litigants and the
courts who side with them paint other actors as depriving these litigants
of preexisting rights to bolster their own legitimacy.
That is not to say that other branches of government take these
claims lying down. Like the proponents in Proposition 8, Congress has
410
responded with bills seeking to “restore” judicial revocation of rights.
Consider, for example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
411
(“RFRA”). In Employment Division v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that enforcement of a neutral and generally applicable regulation
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution
even if it incidentally burdens the religious exercise of an individual or
412
group. This departed from the more stringent Sherbert v. Verner
standard, under which any law that established a substantial burden on
413
religion required compelling justification. In response, Congress enacted
RFRA, establishing strict scrutiny as a federal statutory standard for
justifying enforcement of a general law where it imposes a substantial
burden on religious exercise. RFRA squarely focuses on revocation and
restoration: the Court was not merely in error, but “the Supreme Court
414
virtually eliminated” the previous First Amendment test; the primary
purpose of RFRA (listed first) was not just to correct the Court, but to
415
“restore” the previous definition. The House Report uses similar
416
rhetoric.

408. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 115 (Cal. 2009).
409. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
410. See Ryan Eric Emenaker, Constitutional Interpretation and Congressional Overrides: Changing
Trends in Court-Congress Relations 15 n.36 (Feb. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243912.
411. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2015).
412. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
413. 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963).
414. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
415. Id. 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1).
416. H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 6 (1993).
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But courts are jealous of their position as the ultimate arbiters of the
Constitution, and therefore, as the determiners of when a constitutional
right is taken away. The Supreme Court revealed as much in City of
Boerne v. Flores, which struck down elements of RFRA as incompatible
with the idea that only the court can determine what the substance of a
417
constitutional right is. On Boerne’s account, Smith’s test did nothing to
revoke rights and change the status quo. While the Court admitted (as it
had to) that Smith did not apply the traditional test, it claimed that the
decision nonetheless comported with free exercise jurisprudence as it
418
had always been understood —the court therefore, took nothing away.
This shows a broader pattern in the battle between courts and
legislatures. Courts claim to be above political manipulations of the
rights discourses I have so far described; rights are constant and fixed
and announced by them as appropriate. Engaging in the rhetoric and
restoration endangers this picture. Legislative legitimacy, however, relies
on being responsive and political. Legislatures can maximize their own
legitimacy by painting other entities as political so that they can claim
legislatures as great rights restorers. Thus, they have more to gain by
claiming that constitutional rights are subject to alteration and revision,
that courts can and do take them away, and that legislatures can restore
them.
Ultimately, the institutions that may be involved in these battles are
varied. In the LGBT context alone, reversals involve multiple players,
including legislative bodies. Relationship recognition among same-sex
couples began—and ended almost immediately—in San Francisco in
1989, where the Board of Supervisors passed a domestic partnership
419
ordinance that was soon repealed by initiative. A same-sex-marriage
420
law in Maine was repealed by initiative more recently. Maine voters
421
reenacted the repealed law in 2012. In 1977, Anita Bryant and the Save
our Children Campaign succeeded in their effort to repeal Miami-Dade
422
County’s antidiscrimination ordinance. In Romer v. Evans, where
Colorado repealed municipal ordinances by amending the state
constitution, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of gay rights under the

417. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997).
418. Id. at 513–14.
419. Katherine Bishop, San Francisco Grants Recognition to Couples Who Aren’t Married, N.Y.
Times, May 31, 1989, at A17.
420. John Curran, Main Gay Marriage Vote: Voters Repeal Law Legalizing Gay Marriage,
Huffington Post (Mar. 18, 2010 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/03/maine-gaymarriage-vote-e_n_344688.html.
421. David Sharp, Maine’s Same-Sex Marriage Law Goes Into Effect, Huffington Post (Dec. 29, 2012,
9:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/29/maines-same-sex-marriage-_n_2380334.html.
422. Joanne Mariner, Anita Bryant’s Anti-Gay Legacy, Alternet (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.alternet.org/
story/17737/anita_bryant%27s_anti-gay_legacy.
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Equal Protection Clause for the first time. In each of these states,
individuals were accorded rights only to watch as the law snatched them
away. In such cases, the rhetoric may be somewhat different from that in
this context.

Conclusion
From revocation we come full circle to restoration. Much of the
political debate in this country is nostalgic, seeking to restore an allegedly
idyllic age. But implicit in this notion of restoration is that of
revocation—that age was taken away. Political actors blame various
groups or institutional entities for this, and vice versa. These entities
portray themselves as, and sincerely believe themselves to be, preserving
important interests.
But these interests in granted rights exist. Psychological, philosophical
theorizing, our very understanding that we are and who we are, depend
in part on the rights that we own at a given point in time. At the same
time, our self-understanding consistently evolves. Our evolving selfunderstanding both underlies and draws from the indeterminate and
malleable nature of the terms “rights” and “revocation” in any given
context. But judges and social movements generally cannot be agnostic
as to what interests are legitimate legal rights—and where they
determine that legitimate rights are involved, assuming for a moment the
definition of right and revocation to be exogenously defined and fixed,
they must attempt to remedy rights deprivation. A rights deprivation,
understood as such, works violence, to a greater or lesser degree, in the
conception of the individual. It alters her, changes her capability of
functioning in a certain way, and may transform her in the eyes of the
world, as well as, or, ultimately, in her own eyes, into something less than
what she was. This affective and ontological link with the right never
develops when the right is not previously endowed.
Finally, institutional engagement in rights discourse reifies the
power of rights language. But while institutions infuse rights language
with power, they also draw power from rights language. The way they
wield the language of rights affects their legitimacy and social situation.
Institutions use their relationship with rights to define and describe
themselves. Rights revocation arguments therefore play a role, not just in
shaping the individuals who make them, but the very institutions that
have the power to grant, deny, “revoke,” and “restore,” “rights.”

423. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

